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THE TAMING OF A DUTY - THE TORT 
LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS 
Olin L. Browder* 
For qne inclined to reform the first-year curriculum in law 
schools the most simple and comprehensive solution is to expand the 
treatment of the law on landlord and tenant, and only then break up 
into the traditional basic subjects to deal with matters not previously 
covered. Thereby one could embrace all the traditional first-year 
subjects except Criminal Law, and a good deal more as well. 
The other side of this conceit is that one who approaches the 
modem law of landlord and tenant from traditional property per-
spectives encounters particular problems that arise from the margins, 
or along the frontal thrust, of contract and tort law, and so is thrown 
into their theoretical or philosophical esseµces, and into emerging 
forces of social policies, and even economics. Unfortunately, many 
recent cases dealing with new developments in this field are rife with 
economic assumptions and conclusions, unsupported by any relevant 
data. In this maelstrom of ideas aJ?-d problems, one even encounters 
the boundary lines between contract and tort law, and must learn, if 
he does not know it already, that the line is at least fuzzy, if not 
arbitrary. So one who deals with the law of landlord and tenant 
must consider not only how contract and tort rules directly affect 
property rules, bqt also how the effect of contract law on tort law, or 
vice versa, indirectly affects property law. This, however, is not· an 
entirely new experience, at least for property lawyers. Something of 
the same, perhaps to a lesser degree, is encountered in other areas of 
traditional property law, the most obvious example, of course, being 
the law of bailments, nuisance, and covenants running with the 
land.I 
• James V. Campbell, Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, LL.B. 1937, 
University of Illinois; SJ.D. 1941, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
I. All this is not meant to suggest that property lawyers and teachers, who usually deal 
most fully with the law of landlord and tenant, so far from being narrow technicians, are the 
modem renaissance men. Indeed, who among us does all this ·as it should be done? But we 
· can hardly shun it all together. Someone must try to break out of that familiar pedagogical 
merry-go-round where nobody touches certain areas because they really belong to someone 
else. For, unlike some bypassed backwaters of the law, the law of landlord and tenant reeks 
with modernity and "relevance" and emerging problems requiring new, and sometimes pro-
ducing conflicting, solutions. 
I am not so bold as to believe that in this very limited commentary I can even suggest the 
full dimensions and implications of this __ classificatory maze. I presume only to offer some 
_99 
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It must be conceded that current troubles in this area probably 
have their origins in traditional property law. At least the courts 
continually have been so alleging. In part, the allegation is no doubt 
correct; but in part what is alleged to have been traditional property 
law may be misleading. It may not be entirely beside the point of 
this inquiry into certain property-tort problems to mention at the be-
ginning the litany recited in many landlord-tenant cases that the so-
lution to current problems in this field depends on recognizing leases 
as contract, not property transactions. There are objections to this 
bold and simplistic proposition. The least important objection is the 
inference that leases of old were not contracts. In fact, leases have 
always been contracts, which is not to say that every lease in the past 
was also a contract. In medieval England, before the origin of mod-
em contract doctrines, leases were enforced as covenants.2 They 
were not treated as conveyances, and lessees' rights were in per-
sonam only, and their remedies did not include the recovery of pos-
session from dispossessing third parties. This condition was 
eventually changed in the emergence in the late fifteenth century of 
the action of ejectment.3 After this time, leasehold interests came to 
be treated as estates in land, effectively dividing ownership and leav-
ing a reversion in the lessor, and so taking their place within the 
hierarchy of present and future estates. It has been a long time, how-
ever, since leases were merely conveyances with a "reserved" rent in 
the form of a right to a share of the produce of the land. Leases 
always include promises by one or both the parties respecting the 
premises or their use. In fact, it has long been established that a 
lease, silent respecting rent, contains an implied promise by the 
lessee to pay rent.4 
A further objection to the current effort to wrench leases out of 
property and into contract law is the implication that leases are no 
longer conveyances. If such an idea is seriously expressed, it is of 
course absurd. Ever since the time when lessees acquired estates, 
every lease is in part a conveyance, for it always provides that the 
right to poss~ssion has passed from the lessor to the lessee, with con-
tinuing significant consequences. 5 
analysis, with considerable diffidence, and limited by my own special perspective, of one quite 
restricted part of the law of landlord and tenant. 
2. See 3 w. HOLDWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213 (1923). 
3. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (A. Casner ed. 1952). 
4. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at§ 3.1. 
5. See Siegel, Is the Modem Lease a Contract or a Conveyance-A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. 
URB. L. 649 (1975). Although not now so much in the forefront of courts' attention, it may be 
further objected about the alleged dominance of contracts law in leases that, in respect to those 
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Traditional tort law respecting the liability of landlords for inju-
ries to the person or property of tenants or others on the leased 
premises did indeed derive in part from property law. Since the ten-
ant was an "owner," not merely of his estate of the land "for a time," 
he alone was responsible for the condition of the leased premises. 
The doctrine also derived in part from an application of caveat 
emptor, or "caveat lessee," with respect to the condition of the prem-
ises when possession was delivered, that is, there were no implied 
warranties or other duties imposed by a lease respecting the condi-
tion of the premises when possession was delivered.6 
I believe, however, that this is not a complete explanation of the 
traditional limits on landlords' tort liability. Tort law has always 
had trouble accommodating the distinction between misfeasance and 
nonf easance. It may be argued that, in tort law generally, the dis-
tinction is arbitrary, morally indefensible, and sometimes difficult to 
draw. The fact remains, rightly or .wrongly, and generally speaking, 
that one person has no duty to act affirmatively to protect another 
person or his property from harm. 7 One must find a special reason 
in the relationships or circumstances for holding otherwise. This is 
certainly the problem where one seeks to impose upon landlords a 
duty respecting the condition of leased premises. An old analogy, 
however, will be readily perceived: the duty of landowners or posses-
sors of land to protect persons on their land from unreasonable risk 
of harm. This involves both affirmative and negative duties. The 
reason obviously was that a person entering another's land is at a 
considerable disadvantage in protecting himself against such risks, if 
matters which are currently receiving the most attention, the current solutions are not so much 
a matter of contract or property law as they are of reemergence of a law relating to status. If, 
for example, leases are now to be held to contain an implied warranty of habitability, which 
the parties are forbidden to qualify or modify, how can one call this the application of contract 
law? What sort of contract law is it that prevents parties from contracting altogether, even 
where their express agreement is not unconscionable? One can resort to the fiction if he 
wishes, but it may cause trouble, as we will see. If a landlord is to be responsible for the 
condition of leased premises, for reasons of social and economic policy, that responsibility is 
incurred simply because he is a landlord who has entered into a continuing relationship with 
his tenants, who have received possession of leased premises. See Donahue, Change in Ameri-
can Landlord and Tenant Law, 37 Moo. L. REv. ~42, 258 (1974); Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant 
Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years, 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 369 
(1961); Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranty ef Habitability in Residential 
Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979). 
6. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at§ 3.78; R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY 203 (3d ed. 1981). 
7. "There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental 
than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active misconduct working positive 
injury to others and passive inaction, a failure t~ take positive steps to benefit others, or to 
protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant." Bohlen, The 
Moral JJuty to Aid Others as a Basis ef Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 219 (1908). 
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in fact he can do anything at all about them. Such circumstances 
atise because the landowner is in control of his land. A tenant, how-
ever, is the one who for the most part is in control of the leased 
premises. It would seem that something special must be found in the 
relationship of landlord and tenant to justify imposing tort liability 
on landlords for injuries to tenants resulting from the condition of 
leased premises. As we will discover, to impose upon landlords the 
duty of affirmative action in respect to the condition of premises over 
which they have no control presents special and peculiar problems. 
If one finds a basis for such liability, another problem remains: does 
such liability find a proper place within the broad range of negli-
gence liability, is it strict liability, or is it sui generis, partaking of the 
nature of both? 
We s_hould go no further without first recognizing that the rule 
about the nonliability of landlords long ago ceased to be a correct 
expression of the law. Exceptions of major significance, some ap-
pearing long ago, have eroded the old rule and are now generally 
accepted as part of the traditional law. Most of. these involved the 
imposition of affirmative duties. The rule of nonliability still re-
mained, however, where the exceptions were not applicable. Is this 
still the law? An answer to this question is a primary purpose of this 
study. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL TORT LAW 
The traditional exceptions in tort law to the old doctrine of caveat 
emptor are restated here, with only limited elaboration, consisting 
solely of @their application in recent cases ( during the last fifteen 
years, more or less), and secondary authority. The exceptions are 
equally applicable to residential and commercial leases. 
A. Premises in Landlord's Control 
This is not really an exception to the dogma of caveat emptor. It 
is more closely related to the law on the duty of landowners to per-
sons on their land. Simply stated, the landlord has a duty to use 
reason.able care to keep those portio~ of the premises pver wltlch he 
retains control in a reasonably safe condition. 8 "Possessio~". and 
8. Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978); Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 
378 (Miss. 1982); O'Neal v. Kellet, 284 S.E.2d 707 (N.C. App. 1981). 
In Slusher v. State, 437 N.E.2d 97 (Ind. App. 1982), the defendant landlords, husband and 
wife, were convicted of reckless li~micide on account of the death of a guest.of a0 tenaJJJ who 
wlls killed in a fall from_ a dilapidated outdoor common stairway and landing, the condition of 
whic]l had been made known to the defendants by tenants and local authorities. The convic-
tion was reversed on t}le ground that, although an omission to act can be the basis for a charge 
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"control" are the touchstones here. Accordingly, a landlord's tort lia-
bility extends to dangerous conditions in common areas of apart-
ment buildings,9 defective plumbing or heating units10 and such 
other equipment remaining in the landlord's control that is necessary 
to the tenant's use of the leased premises.11 . 
Since negligence is the standard for liability under this exception, 
the landlord need not make the premises absolutely safe.12 More-
over, he must have knowledge of the defective condition and not 
merely of the existence of circumstances that naturally produce such 
a defect. Imputed knowledge will suffice, however, so that a land-
lord is liable for defects that a reasonable inspection would have 
revealed. 13 
B. Latent Defects 
A landlord's duty with respect to latent defects is not one of in-
spection, nor does it require him to make repairs. It merely means 
that the landlord must disclose a condition of the leased premises 
involving an unreasonable risk of harm if he knows or has reason to 
know of the condition while the tenant does not.14 Thus a landlord is 
ofreclcless homicide, the statute defining that crime was vague on the point, so that the convic-
tion under it violated due process requirements. 
· 9. Essentially, the duty extends to all areas maintained for the tenant's benefit within the 
purposes of the lease. w. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §63, at 407-08 (4th ed. 1971). 
10. See, e.g., Pollack v. Gampel, 163 Conn. 462, 313 A.2d 73 (1972). 
11. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.4 (1977). The duty owed by landlords 
covers persons on the premises with the consent of the tenant. Hiller v. Harsh, 100 ill. App. 3d 
332, 426 N.E.2d 960 (1981). Two recent cases have imposed the same duty where, although 
the tenant possessed the premises, the lease permitted the landlord to enter at any time to make 
repairs. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N. Y. Cent R.R., 389 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1968); Lemm v. 
Gould, 425 S.W.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. Mo. _1968); Jones v. Houston Aristocrat Apartments, Ltd., 572 
S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). . 
12. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF PROPERTY§ 17.3 comment k (1977). See Doyle v. Exxon 
Corp., 592 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979). 
13. See, e.g., Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). 
The Texas court recently abandoned its "no-duty" rule, which seemed to say that a land-
lord owed no duty with respect to known or obvious defects. See Parker v. Highland Park, 
Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Sup. Ct 1978) (rejecting a doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk 
and relying on the principles of negligence, contributory negligence and comparative negli-
gence). 
In Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281,- 629 P.2d 784 (N.M. App. 1980), the court applied res ipsa 
/oquitur to a case involving a fire in a hot water heater in a leased apartment in a mobile home 
which was in the exclusive control of the landlord. One justice dissented on the ground of the 
lack of evidence of the cause of the fire. 
In dictum in Esbenshade v. National Life Ins. Co., 208 Neb. 216, 303 N.W.2d 272 (1981), 
the court said that a landlord is not liable for injuries in a common area when the danger is 
inherent and the conditions complained of are obvious to the injured party. 
Liability has been imposed on a landlord where injury resulted from a hole in the ground 
adjacent to but not owned by the landlord, but where the landlord had assumed control 
Smith v. Rengel, 97 Ill. App. 3d 204, 422 N.E.2d 1146 (1981). 
14. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS § 358 (1965). This means that the landlord 
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obliged to "inform" the tenant. 
C. Contract To Repair 
The troublesome intersection between contract and tort law is ap-
parent here. Courts have split on the question of a landlord's tort 
liability where the landlord's breach of a contract to keep the leased 
premises in repair proximately causes his tenant's injuries.15 Tradi-
tionally, court!! have opposed liability on two simple grounds: (1) 
that a breach of contract creates only contract remedies and (2) that 
unless specifically indicated, the contracting parties did not contem-
plate injury to persons or property.16 
The more modem view, endorsed by the Restatements (Second) of 
Torts and Property, holds that a landlord may be liable in tort, but 
only if (1) he has notice of the need for repair, (2) he fails to exercise 
reasonable care to perform his obligation and (3) the resulting state 
of disrepair creates an unreasonable risk of harm. 
A variety of rationales for tort liability has been given, not all of 
which are persuasive. It has been suggested that the contract deters 
the tenant from making repairs, but Prosser has suggested that the 
significant factor is the peculiar relation between the parties which 
gives a tenant a special reason to rely on the contract, and which 
invokes those familiar modem assertions about placing the burden 
on the party best able to bear it. 17 
In several recent cases the courts overruled prior cases to adopt 
the rule of the Restatements .18 On the other hand, two courts have 
recently asserted the old rule ofnon-liability.19 An Illinois court took 
a middle ground by requiring circumstances showing that the parties 
has informati~n from which a reasonable person would infer that the condition exists. In 
Lemley v. Penner, 230 Kan. 25, 630 P.2d 1086 (1981), no liability was imposed where the 
defect was as readily discernible to the tenant as to the landlord. 
Some courts, however, do state a stricter requirement of knowledge by the landlord. See 
Alvarez v. DeAquirre, 395 So. 2d 213 (Fla. App. 1981); Loflin v. Thornton, 394 So. 2d 905 
(Miss. Sup. Ct. 1981); Gehrke v. General Theatre Corp., 207 Neb. 301, 298 N.W.2d 773 (1980). 
C.f. Younger v. United States, 662 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1982). 
15. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.5, reporter's note (1977). 
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 63, at 408-09. Under this view, of course, only parties to 
the contract (to repair)"would have any remedy. Invitees, for example, could not assert a 
contractual right, even as third-party beneficiaries. 
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 63 at 410. 
18. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 258 N.W.2d 30 (1977); Putnam v. Stout, 38 
N.W.2d 607, 381 N.Y.2d 607, 381 N.Y. S.2d 848, 345 N.E.2d 319 (1976); Reitmeyer v. 
Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968); Rampone v. Wauskuck Bldgs., Inc. 227 A.2d 586 
(R.I. 1967). 
19. Phillips v. Mills, 5 N.C. App. 150, 167 S.E.2d 817 (1969); Payton v. Rowland, 208 Va. 
24, 155 S.E.2d 36 (1967). 
November 1982] The Taming of a .Duty 105 
contemplated tort liability.20 
D. Negligence in Making Repairs 
This is the only exception where the duty does not specify affirm-
ative action, a breach of which consists of a failure to act. The main 
question here is whether one who owes no duty to act for another's 
protection owes a duty, if he acts, to act reasonably. According to 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one who undertakes to render 
services to another must act with reasonable care.21 More specifi-
cally, the Restatement (Second) of Property states that this duty ap-
plies to a landlord who, through his negligence in making repairs, 
gives the leased premises a deceptive appearance of safety or in fact 
creates an even more dangerous situation.22 
At least one court, however, has strayed from a pure negligence 
standard. A recent Massachusetts case, Markarian v. Simonian,23 
held that although a landlord who contracts to repair is liable for his 
ordinary negligence, one who makes gratuitous repairs is liable only 
for gross negligence. 24 
20. Gula v. Farve!, 71 Ill. App. 2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966). One case imposing tort 
liability held that such a result is not precluded by a provision in the lease permitting the 
tenant to make repairs where the landlord after notice failed to make the repairs within ten 
days. McCreless v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 533 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). As that case 
held, there is no reason to distinguish between liability for personal injuries and property dam-
ages. A Kansas court, after having accepted the Restatement rule, rejected an allegation of 
contributory negligence where the tenant had no entrance to the premises other than a defec-
tive front sidewalk. Richardson v. Weckworth, 212 Kan. 88, 509 P.2d 1113 (1973). 
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.7 (1977). The Restatement rules im-
pose liability for physical harm to the tenant and those on the property with the tenant's con-
sent 
Apparently, some authority supports the notion that a landlord is liable for mere failure to 
use reasonable care under the circumstances, regardless of the Restatement's requirements. See 
W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 63, at 411. 
The Restatement rule does not apply if a landlord makes no repairs where, after having 
promised to make them, he "assures" the tenant that they have been made. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.7 comment c (1977). Thus, the landlord cannot give the leased 
property a deceptive appearance of safety. One court has held, however, that a landlord is not 
liable where the tenant knew the attempted repair was ineffective. Haga v. Childress, 43 N.C. 
App. 302, 258 S.E.2d 836 (1979), appeal denied, 299 N.C. 120, 261 S.E.2d 923 (1980). 
23. 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718 (1977). 
24. For a general statement of the Massachusetts rule and citations to cases supporting it, 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.7, reporter's note 8 (1977). If a landlord con-
tracts to repair, under Massachusetts law he is liable for ordinary negligence, but not for fail-
ure to make the repair.- Markarian v. Simonian, 373 Mass. 669, 672-73, 369 N.E.2d 718, 720 
(1977). 
The court in Markarian distinguished an earlier, similar case, Chelefou v. Springfield Inst. 
for Sav., 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937). In Chelefau, a child fell through a window over 
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E. Violation of Statutes 
The violation of a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation 
as a basis for the tort liability of a landlord is not ordinarily men-
tioned as an exception to caveat emptor. The reason may be that the 
rule involved is not a landlord-tenant rule but a rule of tort law gen-
erally. Its recent growth in the landlord-tenant cases may also reflect 
the considerable recent increase in housing laws at both the state and 
local levels. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts25 declares an intricate stan-
dard for the conduct of a reasonable man based upon legislation or 
an administrative regulation. Since most legislation regulating the 
conduct of persons is penal in nature, the use of such legislation also 
to declare duties owed by one person to another is considerably re-
stricted respecting the persons and interests to be protected and the 
hazards against which persons are to be protected. 
The basis for deriving civil- liability from an imposed penal lia-
blity is not obvious, nor are courts agreed about what it really is.26 A 
penal statute may justify or require the connection by its terms, 
properly construed, but this is rarely true. In the ordinary case, a 
court may simply borrow the penal requirement as a standard for 
tort liability; the Restatement in fact says that a "court may adopt as 
a standard of conduct of a reasonable man" the requirement of a 
statute or administrative regulation.27 In other words, there is no 
necessary or inherent connection between the two. It is clear that 
many enacted requirements do not sensibly lend themselves to such 
treatment. Those that do are those which suggest that the require-
ment is imposed not merely in the general public interest, but for the 
protection of certain classes of persons. In such a case, it is hardly a 
great leap, but seems rather a natural corollary, to say that the pur-
poses of the enactment, and the public interest, are best served by 
giving a remedy to those persons who are injured by a violation of 
the enacted duty. In respect to landlord-tenant law, many of the re-
which the landlord had placed a screen. Since the purpose of the screen was to keep out 
insects, not to serve as a safety barrier, the landlord could not have foreseen the injury. 
Other courts have relied on the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 323 (1965) (dealing 
with negligent performance of an undertaking to render services) to hold a landlord liable. 
See, e.g., Anderson v. Kroh, 301 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1981) (conduct complained of was not an 
attempted repair, but rather a negligent attempt to relight a propane water heater). 
A recent Kentucky case reaffirmed the rule that a landlord's liability encompasses negligent 
repairs made by an independent contractor in his employ. See Rieti.e v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 
613 (Ky. 1970). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 19.3 (1977). 
25. §§ 285-288 (1965), 
26. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 36, at 190 et seq. 
27. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). 
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quirements of building or housing codes imposed on property own-
ers, and :µi.ore clearly those imposed on landlords as such, readily fall 
into this category. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts further declares that a viola-
tion of a statute or regulation that has been adopted as a standard of 
conduct for a reasonable man is "negligence in itself,"28 unless the 
violation is among a list of "excused violations."29 The rigid harsh-
ness of such a rule is softened and given a negligence flavor by the 
nature of at least some of the excused violations. Obviously the act 
complained of must be the legal cause of the injury, and presumably 
the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are 
available. • 
The more recent Restatement (Second) of Property declares a 
more simple rule. 30 A landlord is liable for physical harm to the 
tenant ( or others on the leased premises with the consent of the ten-
ant) caused by a dangerous condition existing before or after the ten-
ant has taken possession, if the landlord ''has failed to exercise 
reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence of the con-
dition is a violation of . . . (2) a duty created by statute or adminis-
trative regulation." The comment adds that the landlord is liable 
only for conditions of which he is aware or which he could have 
known by the exercise of reasonable care.31 The landlord is ordi-
narily chargeable with notice of conditions existing when the tenant 
takes possession. 
Most of the recent cases dealing with the effects of violations of 
statutes involve violations of simple, specific requirements declared 
in building or housing codes. It is obvious that the more sweeping 
recent legislation, referred to below,32 which virtually abolishes ca-
veat emptor and imposes a requirement of habitability or the like, 
invokes the same principle. 
In several recent cases the courts refused to construe administra-
28. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B{I) (1965). 
29. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965): 
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not 
negligence 
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its viola-
tion is excused when 
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity; 
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance; 
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or cure to comply; 
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct; 
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others. 
30. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.6(2) (1977). 
31. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.6(2), comment c (1977). 
32. See text at note 55 infra. 
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tive regulations governing the condition of stairways or the keeping 
of fireworks on commercial premises as affecting the relation of 
landlord and tenant. 33 
A number of courts have held that the violation of a statute is 
evidence of negligence,34 or at least evidence of negligence,35 or 
prim.a facie evidence of negligence.36 Other courts have merely 
stated that the question is whether the landlord was negligent in vio-
lating a statutory provision.37 It has been held that a landlord is 
liable for the negligence of a contractor who constructed a porch in 
violation of the applicable housing code.38 
In several cases the courts held that the particular violations of 
local codes amounted to negligence per se39 or negligence as a matter 
of law.40 Some emphasis in these cases was laid on the usual re-
quirement that the plaintiffs were within the class of persons for 
whose protections the ordinances were passed. 
The enforcement of building or housing codes is usually vested in 
officers or administrative agencies who inspect premises and issue 
notices of violations. Normally no penalties are imposed unless the 
landowner unreasonably delays making the prescribed changes, and 
the penalties themselves are hardly intimidating unless conditions 
have reached such a state as to justify the issuance of an order re-
quiring abandonment of the premises or the appointment of a re-
ceiver. To impose liability on landlords for injuries received by 
33. Hatfield v. Palles, 537 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1976); Stover v. Fechtman, 140 Ind. App. 62, 
222 N.E.2d 281 (1966); Stapleton v. Cohen, 353 Mass. 53, 288 N.E.2d 64 (1967), cert. denied, 
391 U.S. 968 (1968). One court held that an ordinance requiring landowners to keep stairways 
in repair could not be used by a person hired by a tenant to wash windows against a landlord 
who was not found to be in control of the premises. Coshenent v. Holbub, 80 Ill. App. 3d 430, 
399 N.E.2d 1022 (1980). 
34. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mngmt, 108 App. D.C. 385, 282 F.2d 943 (1960); Williams v. 
Foutes, 417 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 1981); Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, 355 Mass. 665,246 
N.E.2d 798 (1969). 
35. McCoy v. Coral Hills Assocs., 264 A.2d 896 (D.C. App. 1970). 
36. Enis v. Ba-Call Bldg. Corp., 639 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1980); Gula v. Farvel, 71 Ill. App. 
2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42 (1966). 
37. Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999 (D.C. App. 1980); Grant v. Hepshir, 257 Cal. App. 2d 
375, 64 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1967); Ford v. Ja-Sin, 420 A.2d 184 (Del. Super. 1980); Yoder v. Green-
wald, 246 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1971). 
38. Gardenville Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 266 A.2d 101 (1976); cf. RESTATE• 
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Landlord and Tenant)§ 19.1 (1977). 
39. Schwartzman v. Weiner, 319 A.2d 48 (Del. Super 1974); John's Pass Seaford Co. v. 
Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla. App. 1979). 
40. Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92,256 A.2d 246 (1969). One court held that, assum-
ing a violation of a city housing code, the tenant assumed the risk of injury by continuing to 
live on the premises, and in case of injury, is guilty of contributory negligence. Thompson v, 
Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970). Such a view has been rejected and is not 
likely to find much favor. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
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tenants and others resulting from code violations, especially when 
such liability can produce jury verdicts for damages in large 
amounts, is a more serious matter. Unless one can discount the im-
pact of such liability on the assumption that landlords will be pro-
tected by liability insurance, one can understand the torts 
Restatement's effort to detail specific limitations on liability. In fact, 
it may raise some doubt about the negligence per se rule. On the 
surface, at least, the position of the property Restatement41 that a 
landlord is liable in such circumstances for failure to exercise reason-
able care to repair the defective conditions may seem more appeal-
ing. On the other hand, the latter view will usually put the question 
of liability in the hands of a jury, who may not be prepared to han-
dle the inescapable refinements or distinctions necessary to keep the 
liability rule from becoming oppressive. There is also some justifica-
tion for assuming that in cases of doubt about the proper limits of 
liability the verdict will be against the landlord. Under the torts Re-
statement ,42 presumably a court must first sift out those cases involv-
ing one or more of the variety of excused violations. 
Il. THE GREAT UPHEAVAL 
A. The Implied Warranty of Habitability 
Beginning about twelve years ago, in Javins v. First National Re-
alty Coporation,43 a frontal assault was launched against fundamen-
tal features oflandlord and tenant law. It really began in Wisconsin, 
ten years earlier, in Pines v. Perssion;44 but Javins was the leading 
case in delineating the dimensions of what was happening. Funda-
mental deficiencies in traditional law in dealing with slumlords, and 
perhaps with mass housing generally in urban areas, had been 
bruited about for some time. When indigent or low-income tenants 
became armed with counsel, the deficiencies in the law became fo-
cused and glaring. The main substantive defect was that the duty to 
repair leased premises rested on tenants. If this is reversed to put the 
duty on landlords, another more difficult remedial problem remains. 
Breaches of duty by landlords traditionally invoked the remedy of 
41. See text at note 30 supra. 
42. See note 27 supra. 
43. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
44. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In Pines, the Wisconsin court extended the 
implied warranty of habitability, theretofore applicable only to leases of furnished dwellings 
and dwellings under construction, to leased residential property in general. Arguably, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled Pines, sub si/entio, in Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 
174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). / 
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damages or of constructive eviction, which required that aggrieved 
tenants leave the premises affected. Obviously neither was adequate 
or effective for seriously dilapidated housing. The need was for an 
effective remedy that would permit tenants to stay put. The solution 
proclaimed was a double-barreled assault that employed contract in-
gredients. An implied warranty of habitability was laid upon land-
lords, without any hesitation about what a warranty really is, or the 
full consequences of imposing it. Further, if tenants were not to be 
left merely with a new remedy for damages, the traditional rule of 
the independence of covenants in leases was declared abandoned, 
but without explaining that it was not necessary or desirable that 
every promise by a lessee be dependent on any promise by the lessor, 
or vice versa. This enabled tenants to withhold rent and resist a suit 
for eviction by proving violation of the implied warranty. This rem-
edy, strictly speaking, was not rent withholding, if that is seen as 
merely procedural, without affecting the tenant's duty to pay rent or 
determining the ultimate liability of each of the parties under the 
terms of the lease. It is rather rent abatement, which involves a de-
termination of the extent, if any, that a tenant's duty to pay rent has 
been reduced because of the landlord's breach, and leaving a tenant 
subject to the risk that he may still be evicted if he fails to prove the 
landlord's breach, or perhaps even if rent in some amount remains 
unabated. It was further held that, in view of the policy of the new 
law, the warranty of habitability could not be waived by the lease or 
otherwise.45 
To justify the judicial assumption of authority to produce so 
drastic and detailed a change in prior law, the court in Javins said 
that the traditional rules derived from feudal property law in an 
agrarian economy, where the value derived by the lease was in the 
land itself.46 This was contrasted with modem urban conditions in 
which tenants expect "a well-known package of goods and services 
- a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also 
adequate heat, light, and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, 
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper mainte-
nance."47 These circumstances called for treating leases like any 
other contract, and for finding that the implication of a warranty is 
45. In Javins, the court refused to consider whether the tenant's express covenant to repair 
constituted a waiver of the implied warranty because the parties may not waive or shift duties 
imposed by the housing code. 428 F.2d at 1081-82. Moverover, "[a]ny private agreement to 
shift the duties would be illegal and unenforceable." 428 F.2d at 1082 n.58. 
46. 428 F.2d at 1077. 
47. 428 F.2d at 1074 (footnote omitted). 
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at least analogous to the implied warranties in the sale of goods.48 
Further policy support was found in the unequal bargaining power 
of landlord and tenant.49 
This over-simplified and superficial litany has been repeated al-
most verbatim by most of the courts in the fifteen states where the 
law declared in Javins has been substantially adopted.so It is not 
necessary to restate this development in detail, even where the courts 
clarified some of the implications left in doubt by Javins, or in some 
significant particulars departed from Javins. Several points, relevant 
to the purpose of this Article, may be mentioned. It seems clear that 
the implied warranty of habitability, etc., was designed for residen-
tial housing only, and it is not likely to be applicable to commerical 
leases, at least without important limitations, or by way of analogy.st 
In some jurisdictions, the warranty is limited to leases of multi-unit 
housing, but more often it has been extended to all residential 
leases.s2 The scope of warranty has usually been measured by the 
terms of applicable housing codes; but this does not mean that every 
violation of a housing code is a breach of warranty, nor that there 
can be no breach of warranty without a violation of a housing code. 
Some courts perceived that the effectuation of the warranty of 
habitability does not require entering the throes of the dependency 
of covenants under contract law.s3 All that is needed is to recognize 
that a claim for damages sustained by a tenant can be asserted in a 
summary proceeding for possession by a landlord for nonpayment of 
48. The Javins court outlined, in considerable detail, the use of implied warranties in the 
modem commercial codes. See 428 F.2d at 1075. 
49. See 428 F.2d at 1079. For documentation of the disparity in bargaining power between 
landlord and tenant, see generally Edward v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); 2 R. Pow-
ELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 221(1], at 183 (1967). 
50. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); 
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426,462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 
Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 
N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 
111 N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambins, 63 N.J. 460,308 A.2d 17 (1973); Tonetti 
v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Glyco v. Schulte, 350 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 
N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Kamarath v. 
Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); 
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). See generally Cunningham, The New Implied 
and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 
URB. L. ANN. 3, at 74-81 (1979). 
51. q. Reste Realty Co. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). 
52. See Cunningham, supra note 5, at 81. 
53. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 357-59, 280 N.E.2d 208, 212-13; Mease v. 
Fox, 200 N.W.2d at 793 (suit by landlord for rent); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d at 659-60 
(suit by tenant for damages). A claim for damages sustained by a tenant may be asserted in a 
summary proceeding for possession brought by the landlord for nonpayment of rent. 
112 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:99 
rent or other breach. Some of the summary possession statutes rigor-
ously limit the defenses available to the tenant to insure the expedi-
tious nature of the proceedings. The Illinois court found no 
insuperable difficulty on this score, when a tenant asserts a breach of 
the warranty of habitability.54 
Most of the courts that have declared the warranty of habitabil-
ity, as in Javins, have said that the compelling policy reasons sup-
porting the new law would be subverted if the parties to a lease 
could, by contract or otherwise, disclaim, waive, or modify the 
warranty. 
The most startling feature of the new warranty is that it was 
made applicable to the conditions ofleased premises both at the time 
of the lease and thereafter throughout the term of the tenancy. How 
can the latter of these elements be called a warranty at all? It looks 
like an implied promise to keep the premises in repair. Having re-
gard for the real nature of a warranty, and that it is even something 
of a strain to speak of it as essentially contractual, how much sense is 
there in saying that one warrants his own future conduct respecting 
the condition of the thing he has sold and warranted? It is of course 
conceivable, but it is at least unprecedented. If one objects that this 
is only a play on words, it may appear in due course that a source of 
difficulty with this problem is the conceptual apparatus chosen to 
explain legal liability and unfortunate and unnecessary confusion in 
handling all its implications. 
B; Statutory Enlargement of Statutory Duties 
A less publicized and dramatic, but a more sweeping, phase of 
the big change-over in landlord and tenant law has been action by 
the various state legislatures. This development, together with the 
movement of courts mentioned above, has constituted a phenome-
non second only in the time taken to do it and in the extent of its 
acceptance to the sweeping enactment of condominium law twenty · 
years earlier. The legislation has consisted of the enactment or 
amendment of landlord and tenant codes and laws, almost all of 
which have created a new duty in landlords similar in scope to the 
implied warranty of habitability declared by some courts.55 Consid-
54. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d at 357-59, 280 N.E.2d at 212-13. 
55. See ALAsKA STAT. § 34.03.100; ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §33.1324 (1974); CONN. GEN, 
STAT.§ 47a-7 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1975); FLA, STAT. ANN,§ 83.51 (1976); 
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-42 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-320 (1979); IOWA CODE § 562A,15 
(1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 58-2553 (1976); KY. REv. STAT.§ 383.595 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980); Mo. REAL PROP. ANN. CODE § 8.211 (1981); MASS, ANN. 
LAWS ch. 186 § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.139 (1979); MINN, 
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ering the new legislation together with recent judicial declarations, 
over forty jurisdictions56 have made the change in one form or de-
gree or another; and the process may not yet have ended. 
All this means that the change is no longer thought of merely as 
an effort to eliminate congested slum housing in large cities. In fact, 
it is now widely believed that neither this _nor any other change in 
the private law oflandlord and tenant will accomplish that objective. 
One can infer that the change was not thought of as an attack upon 
any particular social problem or evil, but that under conditions gen-
erally prevailing in our time, the old law is an out-worn relic that 
ought to be discarded. 
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA)57 
no doubt has been at least a triggering force in this development. 
The act has been substantially enacted in some states, but generally 
· with varying amounts of additions and elaborations, in respect both 
to the details of the definition of landlord duties and to remedies or . . 
procedures for enforcement. Some statutes in fact bear little resem-
blance to the URLTA, but still leave-it unmist~kable that the pri-
mary responsibility respecting the condition of leased residential 
premises rests upon landlords.58 The statute in Delaware is so 
framed as to apply to both residential and commerical leases. 59 
The new legislation declares a standard that is not new. The duty 
of a landlord to put premises in a condition fit for human habitation 
and repair all subsequent dilapidations has been a part of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code for over a hundred years, 60 and in several other 
states affected by the Field Code.61 This legislation apparently was 
STAT. §504.18 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 441.530 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 70-24-303 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76.1419 (1976); NEV. REv. STAT. § 118A.290 (1981); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 48-A:14, 540:13-d (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A: 42-86 to 97 
(West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 47-8-20 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 235-b(3) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 
(1978); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page 1981), OKI.A. STAT. tit. 41 §118 (1981); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 91.770 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (1969); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§ 43-32-8 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 66-28-304 (1982); TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 
5236f § 2 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE REv. § 55-248.13 (1981); WASH. REv. CODE§ 59.18.060 
(1981); W. VA. CODE§ 37-6-30 {Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT.§ 704.07 {1979). 
56. The only states with neither a relevant statute nor a decision are Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Indiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Utah. · 
57. UNIFORM REsIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
URLTA]. 
58. See, e.g., statutes cited in note 55 supra for Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire and New Jersey. · 
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 {1975). 
60. See CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1941.l (West Supp. 1981). 
61. Such legislation has now been superseded by recent statutes. Section 1941 of the Cali-
fornia.Civil Code has been elaborated in§ 1941.1. · 
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not thought adequate for present conditions, for it restricts a tenant's 
remedy to repairing and deducting from the rent the cost of repair. 
The Georgia Code has long imposed on landlords the duty to make 
all repairs for the preservation or protection of the property.62 More 
rigorous burdens upon landlords have long been imposed in 
Louisiana. 63 
Without attempting here any general survey of the differences in 
the scope of the various statutes, several relevant observations may 
be in order. The URLTA states two primary obligations of lessors: 
to comply with applicable housing codes affecting health and safety, 
and to put and keep the premises in a habitable condition. 64 This 
dual source of a landlord's duty is found in a majority of the stat-
utes. 65 A substantial minority of statutes make no mention of hous-
ing or other laws, but impose the duty to keep the premises 
habitable.66 There are frequent specifications in the scope of this 
duty. The Missouri statute requires a violation of the housing code 
which constitutes a nuisance, 67 and the Wisconsin statute enlarges a 
landlord's common-law duty only to require structural repairs and 
repairs of plumbing, electrical wiring, and machinery and 
equipment.68 
In two statutes imposing a landlord's duty, the relevant provision 
asserts that a landlord "covenants and warrants,"69 and in three stat-
utes it is stated that the landlord "covenants."70 In all the others, the 
words are merely that the landlord "shall" or the like. In respect to 
the tort liability of landlords, this straightforward approach may 
have significance as a way to avoid becoming ensnared in the throes 
of the meaning and implications of warranties as they are found in 
the law on the sale of goods. 
That a landlord's duty extends to the condition of leased prem-
62. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-lll, 112 (1979), § 8S-80S (1978). 
63. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1973). 
64. URLTA, supra note S7, at§ 2.104; id. at§ 2.104(a)(2). The statute imposes other du-
ties relating to maintenance of common areas, services and facilities supplied to tenants; how-
ever, "[i]fthe duty imposed by paragraph (1) is greater than any duty imposed by any other 
paragraph of this subsection, the landlord's duty shall be determined by reference to para-
graph (l)." Id. at § 2.104(a). 
6S. But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § S8-25S3 (1976). 
66. See statutes cited at note SS supra for Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New 
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota and Texas. 
61. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 441.S30 (1978). 
68. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1981). 
69. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 6021 (1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 235b (McKinney 
Supp. 1981). 
70. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 5S4.139 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ S04.18 (Supp. 
1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 34-18-18 (1970). 
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ises both at the beginning and throughout the term is in most of the 
statutes either explicitly stated, as in the URL TA, or implied by a 
more general statement, such as by declaring that a landlord shall 
"at all times during the term" do what is required of him.71 The 
question may be more arguable in those several jurisdictions which 
declare that a landlord covenants or warrants that the premises are 
fit for human habitation. 
A substantial majority of the statutes include the recovery of 
damages among the remedies of a tenant for the breach· of the statu-
tory duty of a landlord. 72 Some of these provide as a condition of 
recovery the giving of notice to the landlord and an allowance of 
time for the landlord to remedy the defect.73 A substantial minority 
of the statutes, however, make no mention of the recovery of 
damages.74 
In only a few statutes is there a specific reference to tort liability. 
The N~braska statute states that the duty imposed is not intended to 
change the existing tort law of the state.75 The North Carolina stat-
ute provides that a violation of the statute shall not constitute neg-
ligence per se. 76 On the other hand, the Massachusetts statute 
provides that a landlord of buildings larger than for three families 
shall within a reasonable time after written notice from a tenant or a 
code enforcement agency of an unsafe condition exercise reasonable 
care to correct it, and that a tenant or other person lawfully on the 
premises who is injured as a result of a failure to correct the condi-
tions shall have an action in tort for damages.77 The Texas statute 
limits a landlord's duty so that, upon notice from the tenant, he shall 
make a diligent effort to repair any condition materially affecting the 
health of an ordinary tenant.78 A provision of the Washington stat-
ute prescribing action by a tenant who is in default in the payment of 
11. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE§ 59.18.060 (1981) ("The landlord will at all times during 
the tenancy keep the premises fit for human habitation. • • ."). 
12. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-230 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 118 A350 (1979); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 47-8-27(A) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1(2) (1978); TEX. REv. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. art. 5236f § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
73. IDAHO CODE § 6-320 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 118A.350 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47-8-27(B) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.6 (1978); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 523f 
§ 6(d) (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
14. See statutes cited in note 55 supra for Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
75. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (1976). 
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(d) (Supp. 1981). 
77. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981). 
78. Tux. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 523f § 6(d) (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
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rent is stated not to be applicable to a civil remedy for negligence or 
intentional damages. 79 
Ill. THE CHANGE IN TORT LAW 
The main purpose of this Article is to inquire as to how courts 
have applied and, more critically, should apply tort standards in 
light of the landlord's increased duties. To some extent, this investi-
gation may be premature. Most of the statutes mentioned in the pre-
vious section,80 for example, are relatively new, and their potential 
influence lies in the future. Although few statutes say anything ex-
plicit about tort liability, 81 courts may find statutory language rele-
vant and even draw inferences from silences or omissions. 
In addition to cases based on statutes, the following discussion 
deals with decisions that respond to prior judicial recognition of an 
implied warranty of habitability. The question is: Do these changes 
in the law affect a landlord's tort liability, and if so, how? This sec-
tion identifies the three general standards under which most of the 
cases seem to fall: (1) no change in the traditional rule oflandlord 
nonliability, with its established exceptions; (2) strict tort liability; 
and (3) a negligence or "reasonable care" standard. 
A. No Change - the Traditional Rule 
In .Dapkunas v. Cagle, 82 the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries 
sustained on the dilapidated back steps of the residence she had 
leased from the defendant, the condition complained of having ex-
isted from the inception of the lease. The Illinois court affirmed the 
dismissal of the complaint under traditional law, noting that none of 
the traditional exceptions applied. 83 The plaintiff relied on Jack 
Spring v. Little, 84 in which the court had declared an implied war-
ranty of habitability. The court found that case not to be controlling 
and that it had not fully rejected caveat emptor. Noting several fac-
tual distinctions, the court insisted that the problem in .Dapkunas was 
not to be treated as involving products liability.85 
79. WASH. REv. CooE § 59.18.080 (1981). 
80. See statutes cited in note 55 supra. 
81. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. 
82. 42 fil App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976). 
83. 42 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 356 N.E.2d at 578. 
84. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). 
85. 42 fil App. 3d at 648, 356 N.W.2d at 578. IJapkunos rejected a products liability ap-
proach and noted that, unlike Jack Spring, plaintiffs had not alleged housing code violations. 
42 fil App. 3d at 649, 356 N.E.2d at ·579. Moreover, the court recognized that the implied 
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A number of Illinois appellate court cases followed .Dapkunas. 
In Cuthbert v. Stemp in, 86 the plaintiff alleged that the landlord made 
an oral promise to make repairs. Since he offered no proof as to 
when the promise was made, however, the court could assume that it 
was made after the lease and was, therefore, nudum pactum. 87 
One year prior to Cuthbert, in Magnotti v. Hughes,88 the same 
court held for the landlord in a wrongful death suit. There, a social 
guest of the tenant died in a fire on the leased premises. Plaintiffs 
alleged that the premises had been a serious firetrap and, moreover, 
that a statute forbidding owners or lessees from allowing such a con-
dition to exist warranted a claim for relief. 89 The court, however, 
stressed that the statute directed a state agency to promulgate specific 
regulations and, since none had issued, a cause of action could not 
stand.90 
A third case relying on .Dapkunas, Webster v. Heim,91 involved 
injuries sustained by a tenant in escaping from an apartment build-
ing fire. The tenant claimed that his landlord's negligence in main-
taining common· areas and failing to disclose defects caused his 
injuries.92 According to the court, however, the landlord had no 
duty to maintain fire exits and fire doors, and the tenant had not 
proved the existence of latent defects.93 In response to plaintifl's ar-
gument that the court should adopt a standard of reasonable care for 
landlords, the court cited .Dapkunas for the proposition that Jack 
Spring does not extend to liability for personal injuries.94 As as-
serted in a subsequent case, .Dapkunas confines Jack Spring to use as 
a "shield" and not as a "spear" with respect to such liability.95 
It is not clear from these cases whether the acceptance of an im-
plied warranty of habitability has no effect upon prior tort law or 
warranty in Jack Spring had served merely as a defense against a landlord's action to recover 
possesion for nonpayment of rent. 42 Ill. App. 3d at 650, 356 N.E.2d at 579. 
86. 78 lll. App. 3d 562, 396 N.E.2d 1197 (1979). 
87. 78 ill. App. 3d at 569, 396 N.E.2d at 1203. 
88. 57 ill. App. 3d 1000, 373 N.E.2d 801 (1978). 
89. 57 Ill. App. 3d at 1002, 373 N.E.2d at 802. The flimsily constructed cabin consisted 
mainly of plywood and flammable glue and had neither smoke alarms nor fire extingu~hers. 
90. 57 Ill. App. 3d at 1006, 373 N.E.2d at 805. 
91, 80 ill. App. 3d 315, 399 N.E.2d 690 (1980). 
92. 80 ill. App. 3d at 316,399 N.E.2d at 691. 
93. 80 ill. App. 3d at 317,399 N.E.2d at 692. 
94. 80 Ill. App. 3d at 317, 399 N.E.2d at 692. 
95. Beese v. National Bank, 82 ill. App. 3d 932, 935-36, 403 N.E.2d 595, 598 (1980). Note 
that in the most recent Illinois case, the court merely applied traditional law without referring 
to any alternative, perhaps suggesting that counsel did not urge more. See Gilbreath v. Green-
walt, 88 m. App. 3d 308, 410 N.E.2d 539 (1980). 
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whether the cases leave room for some sort of limited application of 
the new contract rule in tort law. 
The Kansas court, in Borders v. Roseberry,96 presented the most 
elaborate statement of traditional tort liability to date. After consid-
ering and :finding inapplicable each of the recognized exceptions to 
the rule of non-liability,97 the court held for the defendant/landlord. 
Strangely, the court failed to consider the effect upon tort liability of 
the implied warranty of habitability, which it had accepted the previ-
ous year in Steele v. Latimer.98 Possibly, the grounds for argument 
in Borders were frozen prior to Steele. More likely, however, plain-
tiffs counsel erred in neglecting to adapt their arguments to the 
changed law. 
Until very recently, the Ohio courts' position was similar to that 
taken both in Illinois and Kansas. In Thrash v. Hi/1,99 the plaintiff 
was injured when the apartment ceiling collapsed. His claim for re-
lief relied upon the new Landlords and Tenants Act, 100 which re-
quired landlords to make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably 
necessary to keep the premises fit and habitable. While it provided 
the standard remedies-termination of the lease and deposit of rent 
in escrow-the Act said nothing about tort liability. In a four-to-
three decision and per curiam opinion, the court interpreted this to 
mean that the Act does not apply in tort cases.101 
Thrash v. Hill was emphatically overruled little more than a year 
later.1°2 
B. Strict Liability 
Where statutes or decisions impose a new duty on landlords re-
specting the condition of leased premises, confusion has ensued con-
cerning the dimensions of the duty and the consequences of a 
breach. If the duty extends to the condition of leased premises both 
at the beginning and throughout the term, a question arises concern-
ing the very nature of tlie duty. If the duty is imposed by a statute 
which imposes the duty in both situations, one may simply deal with 
96. 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366 (1975). 
97. 216 Kan. at 488-94, 532 P.2d at 1360-72. 
98. 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974). Apparently, the Borders court relied on the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 357-61, 379 (1965). See 216 Kan. at 488-93, 532 P.2d at 
1369-72. 
99. 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980). 
100. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page Supp. 1981). 
101. 63 Ohio SL 2d at 181-82, 407 N.E.2d at 498. 
102. See Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20,427 N.E.2d 774 (1981); note 
186 infra and accompanying text. 
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a breach of duty in terms of the tort consequences of a violation of a 
statute. This leaves one to wrestle with the problems of negligence 
per se, and what that properly means. If the duty is stated, by deci-
sion or by statute, in terms of a warranty of habitability, even greater 
difficulty is encountered with the meaning of a warranty, particularly 
when the warranty is deemed to apply to the dilapidations of leased 
premises arising after the lease is made. In any case, if one sticks to 
the notion that a breach of the duty is a breach of warranty, obvious 
civil nontort remedies ensue. Is it also obvious that tort liability also 
automatically ensues? Some courts, sometimes without thinkine; of 
the inherent difficulties or the alternatives, assume that it does. 
The Massachusetts court struggled with these questions in Crow-
ell v. McCaffrey .103 The plaintiff was injured when a porch, which 
was in disrepair, gave way. The landlord had judgment below be-
cause of the finding that control of the premises had passed to the 
tenant.104 The judgment was reversed. One ground for decision was 
traditional: there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury that the 
landlord had retained control of the porch.105 In addition, the court 
found that the jury should also have had the issue respecting a possi-
ble breach of an implied warranty of habitability, 106 as declared in 
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway.1°7 That case, like the 
others, did not contain any ruling or language on tort liability. It 
also was limited to defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises 
for residential purposes. The latter limitation, however, was not as-
serted in the dissenting opinion, which instead of imposing a more 
general warranty, would confine it to an implied agreement by the 
landlord that the leased premises shall comply with minimum stan-
dards imposed by law and regulations. 108 The court here simply re-
sorted to the minority standard in Hemingway for the purposes of 
this case. In respect to the nature or extent of the landlord's duty, the 
court relied mainly on the old furnished-house-for-a-short-term rule, 
which was first adopted in this country in Massachusetts.109 Appar-
ently that doctrine is not one of negligence, but of strict liability. 
103. 377 Mass. 443, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979). 
104. 377 Mass. at 444, 386 N.E.2d at 1258. 
10S. 377 Mass. at 449, 386 N.E.2d at 1260. 
106. 377 Mass. at 4S0-S3, 386 N.E.2d at 1260-62. 
107. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). 
108. 377 Mass. at 4S1, 386 N.E.2d at 1261. 
109. 377 Mass. at 4S1, 386"N.E.2d at 1261. 
In addition to the usual exceptions to landlord nonliability, some jurisdictions have held 
that in a lease of a furnished house for a short term and for immediate occupancy, the lessor 
implicitly warrants that the premises are fit for human occupancy. This implication stems 
from the assumption that a lessee, in such circumstances, cannot make an adequate inspection 
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While seeming to say that Hemingway removed the limits on the fur-
nished-house doctrine, so that it is now applicable to all residential 
housing, the court nevertheless expressly drew back from passing 
upon such questions as notice to the landlord or the time allowed to 
correct violations, and was content to say merely that the jury would 
have been justified in finding that the landlord, by the exercise of 
reasonable care, could have discovered whatever code violations the 
jury found to have existed.110 Put in this way, the ruling asserts neg-
ligence liability. But strict liability was approved in general terms 
and left standing in the wings. The court seems obviously concerned 
about what to do about the notice requirement and what such a re-
quirement, if declared, would do to an assertion of strict liability. 
One may wonder why the court did not simply apply that section of 
the Massachusetts statute that requires a landlord to exercise reason-
able care to repair defects on written notice111 and give a tort remedy 
for injuries sustained for failure to repair. The statute in fact was 
cited. It is possible, although not clear, that the premises here were 
part of a three-family house, and so fell within the exceptions pro-
vided in the statute of owner-occupied two-or-three-family houses. 
A year later, in Young v. Garwacki,112 the court reversed a judgment 
for the landlord in a suit by a guest of the tenant who was injured in 
a fall when a railing on a second floor porch gave way. The plaintiff 
alleged negligence against the l~dlord. The court traced the old law 
through new developments, ending with an acceptance of a generally 
applicable negligence doctrine, such as announced in Sargent v. 
Ross.113 Instead of simply finding that the above statute was con-
trolling, the court merely asserted at the end of its opinion that the 
statute was consistent with the result reached in this case. Maybe 
again, the statute was not applicable because, although the landlord 
was found to have knowledge of the defect, apparently no written 
notice of the defect had been given to him. The court said, however, 
that a landlord should not be liable in negligence wiless he knew or 
reasonably should have known of the defect and had a reasonable 
opportunity to repair it. In a footnote to this proposition the court 
said that the rule may be different in an action for injuries resulting 
from breach of the warranty .of habitability, citing Crowell and ad-
of the premises before entering the lease. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 3, at 
§ 345; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.6 reporter's note 8 (1977). 
llO. 377 Mass. at 449, 386 N.E.2d at 1260. 
lll. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 19 (Michie-Law. Co-op. 1981). 
ll2. 402 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 1980). 
ll3. ll3 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973), discussed i'!fra at note 192. See 402 N.E.2d at 
1049. 
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ding further that in that case, "We left open the question whether the 
landlord's liability begins only after he has had notice of the defect 
and reasonable time to repair it."114 
A lower New York court, in Kaplan v. Coulston, 115 has provided 
the most comprehensive survey to be found of the arguments for and 
against strict liability for residential landlords. The case involved a 
kitchen cabinet which fell injuring the plaintiffs, who sued originally 
alleging negligence of the landlord, but then moved to amend their 
complaint to assert strict liability for breach of an implied war-
ranty.116 The answer, the court said, lies "in the resolution of the 
conflicting policies that press on all sides of this question." 117 The 
arguments of the New Jersey court in .Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, 
Inc. , us against strict liability, were restated. Others were men-
tioned, relating mostly to the problem of dealing with premises that 
may be new, but may also be old, with conditions of premises arising 
after the lease as well as those existing at the time of the lease, the 
probable lack of recourse by a landlord against suppliers of a build-
ing built long in the past, and the need of notice of defects from a 
tenant who is in control so that the landlord may take corrective 
action.119 
On the other side, the court referred to the advance of strict lia-
bility in analogous areas and to its application in Louisiana 120 to 
landlords for tenant injuries. The court offered this summary of its 
arguments for strict liability: the landlord is in a better position to 
inspect and examine and to know when to repair or replace, he 
makes a profit from the venture, and he is in a better position to 
114. 402 N.E.2d at 1050 n.9. In Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982), 
involving the repeated flooding of the plaintifls' apartment by water and sewage, the court 
affirmed a judgment for damages for the reckless infliction of emotional distress. The court 
said that the landlord had "such a pattern of indifference that its conduct was outrageous, 
'beyond all possible bounds of decency.'" 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
115. 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Civ. Ct. 1976). 
116. 85 Misc. 2d at 745,381 N.Y.S.2d at 634. Section 235-b of the New York Real Prop-
erty Law, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981), which essentially imposes 
such a warranty, was enacted after Kaplan; however, the court cited a prior case which had 
found a warranty, see Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975), and subse-
quently considered whether a violation of the warranty produces strict tort liability. See 85 
Misc. 2d at 746-47, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
117. See 85 Misc. 2d at 748, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 636. 
118. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, '!.lfd., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973), discussed infra 
note 136; construed in 85 Misc. 2d at 748-49, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. But see Trentacost v. 
Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (rejecting notice requirement in criminal intrusion 
context; discussed at note 280 infta and accompanying text). 
119. 85 Misc. 2d at 748, 381 .N.Y.S.2d at 636. 
120. 85 Misc. 2d at 749-51, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38. See text accompanying notes 220-21 
infra. 
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spread the loss by insurance. 121 Although the court did not invoke 
the law of products liability, it added that one of the purposes of 
strict products liability was to eliminate the difficulty of having to 
prove negligence.122 The result was a ruling that those arguments 
prevailed, and so the motion to amend the pleadings was granted.123 
The court in Kaplan mentioned the generally accepted notion 
that strict liability applies to the landlord's personal property found 
in furnished houses. 124 The California courts have extended this 
rule to include a wall-panel heating unit, 125 but, to this point, they 
have avoided a determination of strict liability with respect to struc-
tures such as stairways, balconies and railings. Similarly, a recent 
decision by the Hawaii court in Boudreau v. General Electric Com-
pany, 126 referring to the explosion of a washer-dryer, applied the 
principles of strict liability. 
C. Negligence 
A major problem with assuming that a breach of warranty means 
strict liability has been noted before. As many violations as not will 
relate to the condition of leased premises that arose after the tenant 
took possession under the lease. It only clouds analysis and under-
standing to call these breaches of warranty. It makes no sense to say 
that a landlord represents that he will repair ensuing conditions of 
disrepair. Rather he is making a promise, pure and simple. If one is 
willing to impose strict liability for breach of a true warranty, is it 
sensible to have two rules, strict liability and negligent liability, for 
circumstances that are the same, except that in one case the condi-
tion complained of existed when the lease was made? In fact, it may 
impose some difficulty in litigation to prove when such a condition 
first existed. The so-called warranty of habitability, for tort pur-
poses, should be treated the same as any simple promise to keep the 
leased premises in a safe condition. This difficulty has apparently 
121. 85 Misc. 2d at 752, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39. 
122. 85 Misc. 2d at 750-51, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638. 
123. In two later cases decided under§ 235-b, the courts followed Kaplan. See McGuin-
ness v. Jakubiak, 106 Misc. 2d 317,431 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1980); McBride v. 218 E. 70th 
St. Assocs., 102 Misc. 2d 279, 425 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Term 1979). In McGulnnes, the court 
found that the absence of any provision for damages in 235-b was no obstacle. 
Note, however, that several other New York cases have construed 235-b to justify liability 
for negligence, but not strict liability. See notes 162-63 infta and accompanying text. See 
generally Note, New York~ Search far an Effective Implied Warranty oj Habitability In Residen-
tial Leases, 43 ALB. L. REv. 661 (1979) (criticizing Kaplan). 
124. 85 Misc. 2d at 750, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 637. 
125. See Golden v.-Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). 
126. 625 P.2d 384 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). 
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been perceived by several legislatures that have declared a "cove-
nant" by a landord to keep the premises habitable.127 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Property, as explained below,128 offers a way to 
take special account of defects existing whep. a lease _takes effect 
under a theory of negligence liability. 
As previously noted, 129 the Restatement (Second) of Torts pro-
vides that where a landlord contracts to repair, and if disrepair cre-
ates an unreasonable risk to persons on the property, the landlord is 
liable for physical harm to persons on the property if he "fails to 
exercise reasonable care to perform his contract." What does this 
mean? It certainly means that a breach of covenant alone is not 
enough. It ·seems irrelevant in an action for breach of contract that 
the defaulting party acted reasonably and in good faith. Although it 
may ultimately be a question of making a public policy judgment, 
rather than merely a conceptual classification as between contract 
and tort law, it does seem permissible to say that personal injuries 
from a breach of contract, which can produce large and unexpected 
losses or costs, should be treated if possible as within traditional no-
tions of tort liability. But how can one who breaches a contract still 
have acted reasonably? Several possibilities should be evident. The 
failure of a landlord to act may be because he was unavoidably pre-
vented or delayed in acting. In respect to repairs of leased premises, 
it seems vital that he must know, or under the circumstances should 
have known, of the need for repairs. This, in tum, implies that upon 
discovery of a defect, repairs rarely can be made instantly, on the 
spot. And in actually making repairs, should account be taken of the 
fact that he did all that anyone could be expected to do to make 
them properly? 
In respect to violations of statutes or ordinances, such as building 
or housing codes, or administrative regulations, and even broadly 
stated duties of the lessor to keep premises safe, one might suppose 
that the same kind of analysis is applicable. Account must be taken 
of the fact that many of such statutes impose requirements that do 
not affect the safety of persons using the property. Apart from such 
cases, why should not a landlord be held simply to the duty to act 
reasonably in response to the need for action and also in the process 
of taking action? 
127. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.139 
(1979); N.Y. REAL P~oP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
128. See text accompanying note 132 infra. 
129. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965). 
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As noted above, 130 the Restatement (Second) of Torts offers a 
very complicated standard that is put in terms of a statutory viola-
tion being "negligence in itself," but which is variously restricted, 
including the notion of excused violations, that is not substantially 
different from a duty to use reasonable care to comply with the stat-
utes. We have also noted that in fact some courts have rejected any 
notion of negligence per se and have said that a violation of a statute, 
etc., is evidence, or prima facie evidence of negligence. 131 
If one can extricate himself from all the prevailing preconcep-
tions concerning the nature of this problem, the most simple and 
. obvious avenue to defining a landlord's tort liability respecting the 
condition of leased premises is to brush aside contracts, warranty, or 
statutory violations, and declare a rule of reasonable care, which in-
cludes the duty to respond reasonably to the need for action and to 
act reasonably in doing so. This approach would be based on the 
same policy considerations that caused courts and legislatures to de-
clare a new enlarged duty and to prescribe certain non-tort remedies. 
It would not, however, be derived from an attempt to fashion tort 
remedies for nontort faults. The courts that have declared implied 
warranties of habitability could most easily arrive at such a result. 
In most of those states having new statutes that impose a similar 
general obligation on landlords, courts by construction could do the 
same; that is, they could treat the statutes as enlarging a landlord's 
duty without necessarily defining it in terms of negligence per se. 
Part VI on the tort liability of landlords in the new Restatement 
(Second) of Property has been adroitly and simply framed to escape 
most of the conceptual difficulties mentioned above. In the introduc-
tory note reference is apologetically made to the traditional rule of 
immunity from tort liability, which, however, is given no black-letter 
recognition. The chapter consists almost entirely of a restatement of 
the traditional exceptions, 132 which are identical with those appear-
ing in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. A new one, section 17 .6, is 
added, however, which in practice may supersede all the others. It 
provides that a landlord is liable for physical harm to tenants (and 
others) caused by a dangerous condition on the leased premises if he 
fails to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition, and the con-
dition is in violation of (1) an_ implied warranty of habitability or (2) 
a duty created by statute or administrative regulation. Note first that 
this section completely short circuits the notion that the duty respect-
130. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text. 
131. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text. 
132. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY at§§ 17.1-17.5, 17.7 (1965). 
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ing habitability is a warranty that implies some sort of strict tort lia-
bility. Note also the simple substitute for the complexity of the rules 
stated in the Restatement (Second) ef Torts 133 about the tort conse-
quences of statutory violations. In all cases covered by the section 
the dangerous condition which is the origin of the landlord's duty 
may have originated either before or after the tenant takes posses-
sion. The introductory note also notes that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur has been applied to landlord tort liability. Comment c 
states that a landlord is subject to liability only for conditions for 
which he is aware or which he could have known in the exercise of 
reasonable care. In further elaboration of this requirement, it is 
stated that ordinarily a landlord will be chargeable with knowledge 
of conditions which existed prior to the time the tenant takes posses-
sion. In respect to conditions arising thereafter, a landlord may not 
be able to discover the condition, and so will not be liable until he 
has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition after the 
tenant notifies him of it; but it is stated that a landlord, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, may be able to discover the condition on his 
own. 
This section is applicable to residential property and no position 
is taken on its applicability to commercial or industrial property. 
To those who argue, as have the appellate courts in Illinois, 134 
that the invocation of an implied warranty of habitability was not 
intended to change traditional tort law, the Restatement offers the 
obvious comment about the incongruity of permitting a tenant to 
withhold rent on account of a hole in his floor but denying him any 
remedy for personal injuries sustained as a result of it. 135 
Turning to the cases that have been decided after prior adoption 
of the implied warranty of habitability, Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, 
Inc. , 136 was the first and leading case declaring that the implied war-
ranty of habitability does not impose strict liability on landlords. 
The court said a duty was created in the landlord both by the com-
mon-law rule relating to facilities and equipment under his con-
133. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
134. See notes 82-95 supra. 
135. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF PROPERTY§ 17.6, reporter's note 8 (1977). Section 18.3 
extends the rule of§ 17.6 to physical harm caused to persons outside the leased premises. 
Comment (b) to§ 17.6 states that usual defenses in negligence actions, including contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk, are available to the landlord. Although nothing is said 
about it in the Restatement, presumably rules relating to comparative negligence should also 
be applicable. · 
136. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, a.ffd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d I (1973). 
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trol, 137 and by the Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Act, which enlarged 
the common-law duty to include all parts of the building and equip-
ment.138 On either basis, the court said that the basis for liability is 
negligence, referring specifically to the requirement that the landlord 
knew, or should have known, of the defect and had the opportunity 
to correct it.139 
In denying strict liability the court said that in Marini v. Ire-
land, 140 which declared an implied warranty of habitability, the 
plaintiff faced the remedial dilemma of premises unfit for habitation 
and his inability to assert any defense on that account in the land-
lord's dispossession action. The court said that the new "bill of 
rights" for tenants does not lead to tort liability.141 Did the court 
mean the same thing as the Illinois courts, referred to above, which 
held that the traditional tort law applies despite an implied warranty 
of habitability? If so, .Dwyer should be included among the cases in 
the first section of this Part. In other words, what would be the result 
where the facts are not such as to invoke the Hotel and Multiple 
Dwelling Law or the rule about premises within the landlord's con-
trol? Would a landlord escape liability even if he were negligent? Is 
the court assuming that the implied warranty of habitability either 
produces strict liability or no tort liability at all? The only clear con-
clusion from the case is that the warranty does not invoke strict 
liability. 
In rejecting strict liability, the court proceeded on the assumption 
that if the warranty of habitability were given tort consequences, 
these would be in terms of the strict liability declared in products 
liability cases. The court stated a number of reasons against ac-
cepting this analogy: the landlord was not engaged in mass produc-
tion, had not created a product with a defect preventable by greater 
care at the time of manufacture, does not have 'the expertise to know 
and correct defects,142 and that an apartment has many facilities con-
structed by many artisans with different kinds of expertise and sub-
137. NJ. STAT. ANN.§ 55:13A (West Supp. 1982). This statute imposes much of the same 
sort of duties on the landlord as do most of the recent enactments that purport to amend or 
reform traditional law. It is clear that .Dwyer did not treat the statute as imposing strict 
liability. 
138. 123 NJ. Super. at 52, 301 A.2d at 465. 
139. In speaking of negligence as the basis of liability, the court only referred to the re-
quirement of notice to the landlord and of opportunity to repair. It did not say that a landlord, 
upon receiving notice of a defect, must act as a reasonable person. Perhaps the court implied 
this by identifying the issue as one of negligence. 
140. 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). 
141. 123 NJ. Super. at 55, 301 A.2d at 467. 
142. 123 NJ. Super. at 55, 30_1 A.2d at 467. 
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ject to constant deterioration from many causes.143 
In a later case involving criminal intrusions on leased property, 
the court seems to have changed its position concerning strict 
liability.144 
As in New Jersey, the Texas court, inKamarath v. Bennet,145 de-
clared the implied warranty of habitability. In two later cases in the 
Court of Civil Appeals146 (one in fact decided before the final deci-
sion on appeal in Kamarath ), the court held, as in .Dwyer, that 
Kamarath does not apply in a personal injury case so as to impose 
strict liability. The matter seems now to have been settled by the 
enactment in 1978 of amendments of the law of landlord and tenant, 
which include a provision that a landlord has the duty ''upon actual 
notice . . . to make a diligent effort to repair or remedy any condi-
tion which materially affects the physical health or safety of an ordi-
nary tenant." 147 
A Pennsylvania superior court has held that the implied warranty 
of habitability declared in Pugh v. Holmes 148 produces tort liability 
in landlords for negligence and that there is no breach of warranty 
until notice of a defect is given the landlord and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to repair. 149 The court cited as authority the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Property .150 
A Missouri court held that its previous adoption in King v. 
Moorehead151 of an implied warranty cannot be used to impose lia-
bility on the landlord for latent defects without his actual or con-
structive knowledge of the defect. 152 The court then confessed that 
such a qualification seems to reduce the warranty for tort purposes 
so as to create liability only for negligence.153 Such a conclusion 
may reasonably follow from the stated requirement about a notice or 
knowledge, but it is not necessarily so. One could argue that if a 
landlord acts within a reasonable time after notice of a defect, he 
143. 123 NJ. Super. at 55, 301 A.2d at 467. 
144. See Trentacrost v. Brussel, 82 NJ. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). 
145. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). 
146. Porter v. Lubermen's Invest Corp., 606 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Morris v. 
Kaylor Eng. Co., 565 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). 
147. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
148. 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979). 
149. Rivera v. Selfon Home Repairs & Improvements Co., 439 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 1982). 
150. 439 A.2d at 743. 
151. 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973). . 
152. Henderson v. W.C. Hass Realty Management, 561 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1977) (con-
struing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973)). 
153. 561 S.W.2d at 387. 
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would still be held strictly liable for the consequence of his action. 
In fact, it was held in King v. Moorehead that the warranty itself is 
not breached unless a landlord has received notice of the defect and 
had a reasonable time to repair. It may be noted that this case in-
volved a claim for property damage rather than personal injury. 
The Missouri court relied in part, as have a number of other 
courts, on the Indiana court's decision in Old Town Development Co. 
v. Langford. 154 That case involved the grim consequences of a fire 
resulting from the defective installation of an apartment building's 
heating system. As a result of the fire, a tenant's wife and two chil-
dren were killed and the tenant himself was severely injured. Recog-
nizing for the first time in that state the existence of an implied 
warranty of habitability, the court discussed at some length and with 
approval the applicability of strict liability. 155 The decision in favor 
of the tenant, however, was not based on that ground. The court fell 
back on an application of res ipso loquitur, and, stressing that the 
landlord was also the builder of the building, found him negligent in 
failing properly to inspect the building during construction.156 The 
court was troubled about applying strict liability where a defect 
arises after a lease begins, and in fact recognized that the warranty in 
such a case is really a promise to repair. The court expressed reluc-
tance, as other courts have, to impose liability in such a case if the 
landlord had not had notice of the defect. In fact the court was will-
ing to extend the notice requirement to defects existing when the ten-
ant takes possession. Such a requirement was found to be satisfied 
here in a finding of constructive notice. The court found even that 
holding troublesome, because it implies that notice is imputed on the 
basis of what a reasonable inspection would reveal. Here such an 
inspection would not have revealed the defect. The decision regard-
ing negligence was grounded on the fact that the landlord was also 
the builder and so should have discovered the defect in the process 
of building. The case is the epitome of the true dimensions of our 
problem. It reflects, with a greater degree of perception, the struggle 
that other courts have had in fashioning a warranty of habitability 
for tort purposes. The irony of it all is that Old Town appears not to 
be the law in Indiana. After oral argument on appeal, the case was 
settled, but the Supreme Court saw fit to issue an order declaring: 
"We grant transfer [equivalent of certiorari] and set aside the opin-
154. 561 S.W.2d at 387 (citing Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1976)). 
155. 349 N.E.2d at 765-72, 774-76. 
156. 349 N.E.2d at 781-82. 
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ion of the Court of Appeals in this case."157 I understand that this 
unusual sort of ruling means that the status of the case in Indiana is 
the same as if the opinion of the court below had never been 
written.1ss 
Turning to states which have enacted statutes imposing a duty on 
landlords similar in scope to the usual implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, Washington's recently enacted statute is the most comprehensive 
and detailed code to be found so far in any state.159 The statute has 
been interpreted not to impose strict liability on landlords, 160 the 
court relying on the provision that requires landlords to keep all 
structural components of leased premises in "reasonably good re-
pair." The court construed this language to mean that there is no 
violation until after notice to a landlord and a reasonable time there-
after to repair. 161 
Section 235-b of the New York Real Property Law162 provides 
that in every lease of residential premises the landlord covenants and 
warrants that the premises are fit for human habitation and are not 
subject to conditions dangerous, hazardous, or detrimental to life, 
health, or safety. The lower courts in New York are divided on 
whether this section imposes strict liability on landlords. In the only 
case to reach the Appellate Division, 163 the court refrained from a 
definitive interpretation of the statute. The court expressed its opin-
ion, however, that the section was not intended to extend strict liabil-
ity to landlords with regard to wrongs that had traditionally been in 
the area of tort liability. This was based on the legislative history of 
the section which indicated an intention to codify principles first de-
veloped in decisions in other jurisdictions, citing Javins and others, 
and later in this state.164 The court said there was no hint in those 
decisions of such an extension of tort liability.165 
A Florida court has construed its applicable statute166 to impose 
157. 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977) (per curiam). 
158. Statement to the author by a staff member in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court of Indiana. 
159. See WASH. REv. CooE §§ 59.18.010 to 59.18.900 (1981). 
160. Lincoln v. Fornkoff, 26 Wash. App. 717, 613 P.2d 1212 (1980). 
161. 26 Wash. "App. at 718-19, 613 P.2d at 1213. 
162. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
163. Mahlmann v. Yelverton, 109 Misc. 2d 127, 439 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980). 
164. 109 Misc. 2d 127, at 128-29; 439 N.Y.S.2d 568, at 569-70. 
165. 109 Misc. 2d 127, at 129-30, 439 N.Y.S.2d 568, at 571-72. See also Hamel v. Schmidt, 
106 Misc. 2d 315,431 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (1976). In Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. App. 
1981), the court did not apply the new statute, presumably because the defect in a gas stove 
and water heater were not among those enumerated in the statute. But the court imposed a 
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on landlords the duty to take reasonable precautions to maintain the 
common areas of an apartment house in a safe and clean 
condition.167 
Similarly, the appellate court in North Carolina has, in three re-
cent cases, 168 applied its new statute which expressly requires a land-
lord to keep all common areas in a safe condition, 169 but also 
provides that a violation of the statute is not to be treated as neg-
ligence per se .170 The court construed the statute to require a land-
lord who knows of an unsafe condition, or should have known in the 
exercise of reasonable care, to exercise ordinary care to remove the 
unsafe condition. This duty is not essentially different from the prior 
traditional common law respecting common areas, except that the 
court found the statute to require that the unsafe condition be cor-
rected, not merely that the landlord should warn the tenant of it. 171 
Several cases have scrutinized the District of Columbia's housing 
regulations, which require landlords to keep leased premises in re-
pair so as to provide decent living accommodations.172 One case 
found that the landlord must keep a door sill in a reasonably safe 
condition;173 another, in reversing a directed verdict for the defen-
dant, held that the jury should decide whether the landlord had suffi-
cient notice of a defective window screen and, if so, whether his 
failure to fix it was unreasonable;174 and another, involving the death 
of a child who fell from an allegedly dangerous balcony, ruled that 
the landlord must use reasonable care under the circumstances.175 In 
the last of these, the plaintiff lost for want of proof as to how or why 
the child fell. The court reasoned that strict liability should not ap-
duty which it said corresponded to that statutory duty: to reasonably inspect the premises 
before leasing, and to use reasonable care to repair dangerously defective conditions upon 
notice. See also Thompson v. Rock Springs Mobil Home Park, 413 So. 2d 1213 (Fla App. 
1982). 
167. Forth v. Marhoefer, 406 So. 2d 521 (Fla. App. 1981). 
168. Allen v. Equity & Investors Management Corp., 289 S.E.2d 623 (N.C. App. 1982); 
O'Neal v. Kellett, 284 S.E.2d 707 (N.C. App. 1981); Long v. Ridgewood Assts., 284 S.E.2d 702 
(N.C. App. 1981). 
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1981). 
170. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1981). 
171. Allen v. Equity & Investors Management Corp., 289 S.E.2d 623 (N.C. App. 1982). 
Long v. Ridgewood Assocs., 284 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. App. 1981), involved an injury to a tenant 
from falling on accumulated ice on a pathway between the tenant's apartment and a parking 
lot. 
172. See, e.g., Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Noble v. Worthy, 
378 A.2d 674 (D.C. 1977). 
173. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
174. Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
175. Noble v. Worthy, 378 A.2d 674 (D.C. 1977). 
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ply since a landlord cannot anticipate all possible dangers.176 
Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc., 111 relied on Section 1714 
of the California Civil Code, which makes the landlord responsible 
for injuries "occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or 
skill in the management of his property . . . ."178 The court found 
that a landlord must act reasonably at all times with respect to the 
leased premises.179 In a later case, Golden v. Conway, 180 a defective 
wall-panel heater caused injury to the tenant, and the court ruled 
that the issue of strict liability should be submitted to a jury. This 
can be reconciled with Brennan, however, since the premises were 
nonresidential and the heater, although a part of the premises, in-
voked the law of products liability.181 
Other state courts have followed the trend set by Washington, 
New York, California, and the District of Columbia in construing 
their respective landlord-tenant statutes to require a negligence stan-
dard. 1he Montana court, for example, reached the same conclusion 
as Brennan in applying what it called a "general obligation" stat-
ute. 182 Similarly, a Michigan case rejected strict liability and said 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or should have 
known of an alleged defect and failed to exercise reasonable care in 
repairing it.183 The Delaware court has reached the same result.184 
The Georgia court, in construing an old statute, at least requires no-
tice to a landlord of the need for repairs.185 
176. 378 A.2d at 677. 
· In another case, the court did not rely on housing regulations, but upon Javins to declare 
that a landlord must anticipate dangerous, regularly recurring conditions and take necessary 
precautions. Harris v. H.G. Smithy Co., 429 F.2d 744, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (construing Javins 
v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
177. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, lll Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973). 
178. CAL. C1v. CoDE § 1714(a) (West 1982). Note that the court did not rely on CAL. CIV. 
CODE§ 1941 (West 1954). 
179. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125. 
180. 55 Cal. App."3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). 
181. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 960-63, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 77-79. 
182. See Corrigan v. Janney, 626 P.2d 838, 840-41 (Mont. 1981). 
183. See Hockenhull v. Cutler Hubble, Inc., 39 Mich. App. 163, 167-68, 197 N.W.2d 344, 
345-46 (1972) (construing MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 125.471 (1970) (repealed 1978)). . 
184. See Ford v. Ja-sin, 420 A.2d 184 (Del Super. Ct. 1980). The court held that the appli-
cable landlord-tenant code superseded common law with respect to a landlord's tort liability. 
Although it did not explicitly define the landlord's duty, the court seems to have proceeded on 
a negligence theory, for it cited the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360 (1965). That 
section deals with a landlord's traditional duty respecting common areas, and the court found 
that this duty extended to cover all parts of the leased premises. 420 A.2d at 188. 
185. See Tribble v. Sommers, 115 Ga. App. 847, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967); Marr v. Dieter, 27 
Ga. App. 711, 109 S.E. 532 (1921); McGee v. Hardacre, 27 Ga. App. 106, 107 S.E. 563 (1921). 
These cases all construe the applicable Georgia statute to require notice to or knowledge of the 
landlord with respect to the need for repairs. See GA. CODE ANN.§§ 61-111, 61-112 (1982) 
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The Ohio court, in Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 186 in overrul-
ing Thrash v. Hi!/181 in record time, affirmed a judgment for a tenant 
who was injured by a fall on a defective outside stairway leading to 
her apartment. The court relied on the Landlords and Tenants Act 
of 1974188 which requires a landlord to comply with all relevant 
codes that materially affect health and safety, and to make all re-
pairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the 
premises in a fit and habitable condition. Local officials, upon in-
spection, had found the stairway defective and so informed the land-
lord's secretary. The tenant herself had attempted to give the same 
notice to the landlord. The obstacle to recovery in Thrash v. Hill was 
the fact that the statute specified certain remedies, but none for per-
sonal injuries. Now the court finds that a provision allowing dam-
ages for a breach of any duty imposed by law is sufficient for the 
present purpose. 
It can be assumed that some courts would find the language of 
this statute, in requiring a landlord to do whatever is "reasonably 
necessary," etc., justified liability for negligence. In fact the court 
quotes with approval the relevant section of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Property, 189 which requires a landlord to exercise reasonable 
care to repair when there is a violation of an implied warranty of 
habitability or a statute. But the court, in restating the statutory 
phrase omitted the word "reasonably," and after finding that the 
purpose of the statute is to protect persons using residential premises 
from injuries, declared that the violation of a statute which states 
specific duties is negligence _per se. This principle was qualified only 
by requiring proof of proximate cause and the absence of contribu-
tory negligence, which was satisfied here by the jury's verdict, and 
also by the familiar requirement that the landlord received notice of 
the defective condition, or knew about it, or that the tenant made 
unsuccessful efforts to give notice. 
It has been seen that the notice requirement has been assumed by 
some courts to invoke ordinary negligence as the governing theory of 
(providing that "a landlord must keep the premises in repair" and "is responsible • • • for 
damages arising from defective construction or from damage from failure to keep the premises 
in repair."). One case, however, has held that the statute does not require notice or knowledge 
where conditions resulted from defective construction. See Marr v. Dieter, 27 Ga. App. 711, 
109 S.E. 532 (1921). 
186. 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981). 
187. 63 Ohio SL 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980), discussed supra at note 99. 
188. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (Page Supp. 1981). 
189. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.6 (1977), discussed supra at notes 132 el 
seq. 
' 
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liability. Does the court in Shroades approve the limitations upon 
negligenceperse declared in theRestatement (Second) ofTorts? The 
absence of notice to a landlord of a defect could be treated as within 
one of the "excuses."190 It remains in doubt whether the Ohio court 
will accept the other excuses stated in the Restatement which, as we 
have noted, leave the Restatement rule, in practical effect, little dif-
ferent from a negligence standard.191 Those courts which treat the 
violation of a statute as only evidence of negligence avoid any diffi-
culty on this score. 
The most simple and direct approach to the problem, as previ-
ously noted, is to avoid dealing with tort consequences of breaches of 
contract or warranty or violations of statutes, and to assert an in-
dependent negligence doctrine that is supported by the same policy 
that justifies the imposition of an implied contract or warranty. 
The leading case is Sargent v. Ross, 192 where a tenant's four-year-
old child was killed in a fall from an outside stairway. In affirming a 
judgment for the plaintiff-tenant, the New Hampshire court aban-
doned the old rule of caveat emptor, with its exceptions, and an-
nounced simply the acceptance for landlord-tenant relations of the 
general negligence doctrine of reasonable care in the circum-
stances.193 It should be noted that, as applied to the facts of this case, 
such a doctrine is not a dramatic change in the old law. The land-
lord built the stairway, or was chargeable with building it properly, 
and was liable for building it without taldng reasonable steps to pre-
vent its being unsafe for use by the child of a tenant.194 The court 
stated that this was a simple case of liability for misfeasance. If the 
rule announced by the court is applied to a case where a landlord is 
charged with the failure to act, such as to repair a condition that has 
fallen into disrepair, the rule is misleading. The general law of neg-
ligence does not reach such a case except in special relations between 
190. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 288A(b) (1965). 
191. In Horvath v. Burt, 643 P.2d 1229 (Nev. 1982), the court relied on the Nevada statute 
that imposes a duty on landlords to maintain dwelling units in a habitable condition, and that 
specifically designated that such a unit is not habitable when it lacks electrical lights, etc., in 
conformity to applicable law and in good working order. The plaintiff was injured when she 
jumped from a window to escape a fire in the apartment building in which she was a tenant. 
Presumably on a finding that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring, the court reversed 
a judgment for the defendant. The court said that the jury could have concluded that the 
landlord's failure to inspect the wiring was either common law negligence or negligence per se. 
The landlord argued that he was under no duty to inspect the wiring, but the court said that 
the landlord had had sufficient previous notice of the deteriorated condition of the wiring to 
preclude the landlord's defense. 
192. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). 
193. I 13 N.H. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534. 
194. I 13 N.H. at 399, 308 A.2d at 535. 
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the parties which justify imposing an affirmative duty to act. This 
case must be taken to mean that the court is really declaring that a 
residential landlord-tenant relation is now among those special rela-
tions, and that a landlord owes a duty to his tenant to act reasonably 
to keep leased premises safe. The court said that the special circum-
stances constituting the bases for the traditional exception to the old 
rule are not to be ignored, but that they -are relevant only to the 
question whether the landlord had acted as a reasonable person. 
Unlike the view of other courts which have refused to impose liabil-
ity unless the landlord had knowledge or notice of the defect in a 
reasonable time to act, this factor is merely included among relevant 
factors in deciding whether the landlord acted reasonably. 195 So pre-
sumably the absence of such notice is not a ground for withholding 
the case from a jury. 
Several states have recently aligned themselves with the New 
Hampshire theory of an independent negligence doctrine. The Wis-
consin court in Page!sdorf v. Sefeco Insurance Com_pany 196 made 
clear that the doctrine extends to negligent omissions such as the fail-
ure to maintain a balcony in good repair. 197 In Mansut v. Eu-
banks, 198 the Florida court refused to apply an apparently relevant 
statute;199 instead, it imposed a duty to conduct a reasonable inspec-
tion of the premises before leasing and to use reasonable care to re-
pair dangerously defective conditions. An Arizona case, Presson v. 
Mountian State Pro_perties,200 likewise applied traditional negligence 
theories where a defective water heater injured a tenant and his 
child. Presson held first that a landlord must act as a reasonable 
man in protecting his lessees from ''unreasonably dangerous" condi-
195. 113 N.H. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534. 
196. 91 Wis. 2d 734,284 N.W.2d 55 (1979). 
197. According to the court, the issue in Pagelsdorf was whether the landlord exercised 
ordinary care in maintaining the premises, and the absence or presence of notice is merely one 
of the relevant factors in this determination. 91 Wis.2d at 745,284 N.W.2d at 61. In Maci v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas Co., 314 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. App. 1982), the plaintiff was injured by a 
fall on accumulated ice on a pathway to the garage of a duplex apartment. The jury found the 
defendants 80% negligent. The appellate court, in affirming, followed Pagelsdorf, and added 
that where there is a known and obvious condition which is unavoidable by the person on the 
premises, the possessor (landlord) is not relieved of liability for physical harm merely by 
warning of the condition. 
198. 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981). 
199. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (Harrison 1976) (requiring a residential landlord to 
maintain specified_ parts of the property in good repair). 
200. 18 Ariz. App. 176,501 P.2d 17 (1972). Presson was decided prior to the enactment of 
the Arizona statute that enlarged a landlord's duty. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 
(1974). Nevertheless, nine years later in Shirkey v. Crain & Assocs. Management Co., 129 Ariz. 
128, 130,629 P.2d 95, 97 (Ct. App. 1981), the same court approved of Presson (though it did 
not apply). 
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tions201 and, second, that ~der a negligence theory, the landlord 
must know about the defect.202 Finally, in Hall v. Wanen 203 the 
Utah court fashioned a rule of negligence similar to the one an-
nounced in Sargent v. Ross;204 moreover, it held that, under this law, 
a statutory violation serves merely as evidence of negligence, not as 
negligence per se. 205 
Summary of Negligence Cases 
The New Jersey court held that an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity does not result in strict liability, but tp.e case so holding may no 
longer be the law. It was not perceived that such a warranty may 
have changed the traditional law by imposing a duty on landlords to 
keep leased premises safe, measured by a negligence standard. Sev-
eral other courts seem more clearly to have so held. A considerable 
number of other courts have construed statutes imposing a broad 
duty ofrepair ofleased premises.in the same manner, that is, to have 
created tort liability for negligence. The Ohio court, in following its 
rule of negligence per se, has left its theory of liability in some doubt. 
Other courts have arrived at a negligence standard, not by constru-
ing statutes, or an implied warranty of habitability, but indepen-
dently, as justified by contemporary conditions and expectations. 
A theme running through most of the cases is the necessity for 
notice to a landlord of the need for repair and reasonable time to 
respond. This requirement is often seen as a hallmark of a negli-
gence theory, and as therefore invoking that theory. 
D. Comment on Negligence v. Strict Liability 
Overall, judging by the cases so far, and taking into account the 
position of the Restatement (Second) of Property,206 the prospect of 
the acceptance of strict liability in landlord-tenant cases is not prom-
ising. Among the states conceding changes in the traditional law, it 
has not yet been clearly established as the law in any state. Liability 
for negligence clearly predominates. · 
Looking through the cases to the fundamental issues at stake, it 
should be clear that the use of a warranty as a vehicle for strict liabil-
201. 18 Ariz. App. at 177-78, 501 P.2d at 19. 
202. 18 Ariz. App. at 178, 501 P.2d at 20. 
203. 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). 
204. 632 P.2d at 850. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973); text accom-
panying notes 192-95 supra. 
205. 632 P.2d at 850 n.l. 
206. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY§ 17.6 (1977), discussed supra at note 132. 
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ity is seriously defective. It has been stated before that the so-called 
warranty of habitability, when applied to the facts of many cases 
involving defective premises, is not a warranty at all, but a promise 
to repair. In such cases, apart from other compelling considerations, 
the breach is a simple breach of contract, to which the usual con-
tract-tort relations produce liability for negligence. 
Neither is analysis furthered by treating the products liability law 
as applicable, even as an analogy. There is, of course, an analogy. 
But a resort to products liability law as authority directs attention to 
the fine points of difference or of similarity. Similarities are there, 
but the differences are significant. Efforts to add up the score divert 
attention from the main issue: does current public policy, inhering 
in landlord-tenant relations, compel or justify holding landlords in 
all cases as insurers of the condition of leased premises? To put that 
question does not necessarily suggest a negative answer. A substan-
tial case can be made for such liability, perhaps limited or qualified, 
as will be further explored. 
There is, however, a more substantial obstacle to strict liability, 
which is inherent in the nature of the landlord-tenant relation. Some 
voice keeps repeating, in case after case: the landlord must be given 
notice of the defect and time to repair it. This idea has not fared well 
in the products liability cases. Here it becomes a central theme. Per-
haps for a good reason: the tenant is in possession and control of the 
place where he lives. This fact was the matrix of the old law, which 
was later fragmented by exceptions, now finally abandoned. But its 
last remnant cannot be readily exorcised. It is a remnant of the 
property ingredient in leases. It does make a difference if you are in 
control, if for no other reason than that you are the one who will 
know what is wrong. If you know it, can you hide it or forget about 
it? If your being in possession, or at least in constant contact, is no 
longer the basis for putting all the risks on you, you may well remain 
under a duty to communicate what you see. It is the kind of commu-
nication that tenants have never been reluctant to make; they do it 
all the time, even under the old law. The only alternative is to pre-
scribe a right in a landlord to inspect leased premises regularly. 
Ap~rt from the invasion of privacy this entails, inspection from time 
to time is not an effective substitute for the knowledge of a defect by 
the person who lives there. The ultimate goal of the new regime in 
landlord-tenant law is to keep premises in a habitable condition. 
Can a tenant who sees a defect, perhaps small but possibly danger-
ous, in a floor, a balcony, or in plumbing or heating equipment, be 
permitted to keep it to himself and later claim damages, perhaps 
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staggering damages, for hospitalization or doctors' bills, if he is hurt 
by it, or for wrongful death if his child is killed by it? And where, if 
the defect were made known, it could have been repaired at a rela-
tively insignificant cost to the landlord? I am prepared to believe 
that, where a landlord does not know or have reason to know of a 
defect which is known to a tenant but uncommunicated to the land-
lord, few if any courts of last resort will hold a landlord liable. This 
need not preclude a contrary result where the defect is in a common 
area open to all tenants and within the landlord's control, so that 
knowledge of the defect can be attributed to the landlord. 
One might couch all this in terms of voluntary assumption of 
risk. It may not be sensible to say that a tenant must leave an apart-
ment if necessary to avoid a risk that he knows about. But if he 
continues to encounter it, without seeking to have it abated by his 
landlord, one might say that he assumed the risk. It may be prefera-
ble, however, not to analyze the problem in this manner, for its em-
phasis is upon whether a tenant encountered a known risk, with the 
usual difficulties about whether he had any reasonable alternative. 
It could be held that, after he has notified his landlord of a defect, he 
has no cause of action if he continues to encounter the risk; and the 
courts may confuse assumption of risk with contributory negligence, 
as they sometimes do. The emphasis should rather be upon tl,le duty 
of a landlord to correct defects that he knows about or should know 
about. If a tenant notifies his landlord of a defect, and thereafter 
uses due care to avoid being injured by it, his cause of action should 
be preserved. 
For many, if not most, cases involving injuries caused by defects 
in leased premises, a negligence doctrine will vindicate· the basic 
goals of the new regime in landlord-tenant relations. Such a doctrine 
implies the· requirement that a landlord know or should know of 
such a defect. With the assumed, but perhaps unprovable, inclina-
tion of juries to hold against a landlord in any case where a tenant is 
injured by such a defect, the inclusion of the notice requirement by 
the New Hampshire and Wisconsin courts as merely one of several 
factors to be left to a jury may encounter future objections. If it 
means that a jury is free to dispense with the requirement by empha-
sizing other elements in a plainti.1f s case, it will not be acceptable to 
some courts. 
A word can still be said, however, for strict liability, not by way 
of supplanting negligence doctrine entirely, but only in limited cir-
cumstances. Consider the type of case where a tenant is injured by a 
defect in leased premises which is unknown to him and to the land-
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lord and which could not reasonably have been discovered by either. 
The rule of negligence requiring notice of the defect to the landlord 
will on these facts insulate him from liability and leave the tenant to 
bear his own loss. This is the typical case of a latent defect which, 
under. traditional law, produced no liability unless the landlord knew 
or should have known of the defect.207 The basic policy of forcing 
improvements in deteriorated or defective housing is not relevant if 
no one knows of the particular defect. Is there still a basis in policy 
for shifting the loss to the landlord? If neither party could have re-
duced or avoided an unknown risk, what basis is there for deciding 
who must bear the loss? Since traditionally one must bear his own 
losses unless some ground exists for shifting them to someone else, 
one might find no basis for any kind of tort liability. 
It has been argued in support of the implied warranty of habita-
bility that a landlord is better able to bear the costs of making re-
pairs. It is another matter, however, when losses result from 
personal injuries which can be so large as to constitute a financial 
disaster for any party who must bear them. In the absence of any 
fault on the part of either landlord or tenant, and where the tenant 
has no knowledge of the defect which can be passed to the landlord, 
attention will naturally focus on a possible method of spreading the 
loss. This is hardly the place to expect an assumption of the loss by 
the public through some enacted entitlement program. But losses 
such as these can be effectively spread by insurance. Whose insur-
ance? That, of course, is the question. Landlords generally carry 
liability insurance. If their coverage is extended to include liability 
for the kind of losses referred to above, it may be assumed that their 
insurance rates will increase. Professor Love, in supporting strict lia-
bility on a broader scale than is proposed here, offers some compara-
tive data respecting insurance rates in Louisiana, where strict 
liability is in effect, and in neighboring states.208 These data showed 
no appreciable difference.209 My own more limited inquiry showed 
a difference in such rates, the amount and significance of which is 
difficult to estimate.210 Such data, of course, are deficient in assum-
ing that a difference in rates among the states reflects only a differ-
ence in the extent of the landlord's liability. In any event, any 
2fY1. See text at note 14 supra. 
208. See Love, Landlord's Liability far .Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or 
Strict Liability?, 1975 W1s. L. REv. 19, 135 n.662. 
209. Insurance rates for New Orleans were comparable to other large cities, whereas rates 
for the rest of Louisiana were slightly higher than those in Mississippi and Georgia (excluding 
Atlanta), for example. See id. 
210. The results were as follows: 
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increase in rates is likely to be reflected at least in part in rentals, 
although no reliable assessment of any of these yariables is possible 
on the basis of what is now known. 
On the other hand, if the loss remains on tenants, there is no 
available insurance for them as tenants, but only insurance generally 
available to persons for hospitalization and certain medical ex-
penses. Such insurance probably will not cover all losses suffered by 
tenants from injuries on leased premises. Nor is it known how many 
tenants have such insurance; although it may be assumed that many 
do not. In the absence of any empirical study of major dimensions, 
can any judgment about the effects of such risk-spreading be made?. 
This is riot a new kind of problem, but perhaps only more acute. 
Courts continually make value judgments that may not be supported 
by empirical data, if there were any. Very little of the common law 
is supported by such data. The new regime in landlord-tenant law 
itself-the enlargement of landlord duty apart from tort liability-
has been criticized as representing only a moral judgment, unsup-
ported by economic data.211 There is little room for a moral judg-
ment in assessing the risk-spreading efficacy of a rule of law. Courts 
can decide as they have in other kinds of cases upon such insights as 
they have, perhaps subject to future change in doctrines that are 
proven inadequate. Strict products liability was not hindered by 
such a problem. 
There is another problem here, however. Courts have tradition-
ally avoided framing rules of tort law on the basis of the availability 
of insurance to one or both of the parties in a legal relationship. Re-:-
gimes of no-fault insurance to cover automobile injuries or property 
are a legislative response to special circumstances.2 l 2 No-fault insur-
ance for products liability cases has been recommended.213 Perhaps 
some form of no-fault insurance program could be more easily 
worked out for landlord-tenant law than for the more diverse 
State Rate (per 100 sq. ft.) Date 
Louisiana: 
New Orleans $3.70 8/81 
Remainder of State 2.10 8/81 
Arkansas 1.10 8/81 
Mississippi .96 8/81 
(rates furnished the author by two insurance companies). 
211. Meyers, Tlte Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 879 (1975). 
212. See, e.g., Epstein, Automobile No-Fault .Plans: A Second Look at First .Principles, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 769 (1980) (25 states have adopted no-fault plans). 
213. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PROD-
UCTS AND SERVICES (1975); Cooperrider, Book Review, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 189 (1975). 
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problems in products liability.214 Workmen's Compensation laws 
were not enacted primarily as a device for spreading the risk of loss 
from industrial accidents, although that has been their effect. For 
the present, little reason appears why a court should not proclaim a 
very limited rule such as that proposed here solely on the basis of its 
own assessment of the risk spreading efficiency of the rule.215 The 
court in Kaplan 216 did so with respect to a rule of strict liability much 
broader than the one proposed here, saying merely that a landlord is 
in a better position to spread the loss by insurance.217 
The court in Kaplan referred to other supporting factors, one of 
which was that landlords are in their business for profit; and so it can 
be asserted that liability insurance can be treated as one of the costs 
of their business, as of course it already is.218 The court also in-
cluded the argument that strict liability reduces the cost of lengthy 
jury trials by eliminating the difficulty of proving or disproving 
negligence.219 
It is relevant that the courts in Louisiana have lived for a long 
time with a broad doctrine of strict liability for landlords,220 but lim-
ited by the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk.221 These defenses may have reduced strict liability to a rule 
that is not greatly different from that proposed herein. 
214. New Zealand has adopted this approach with respect to almost all types of accidental 
injuries. See Gaskins, Tori Reform in the Welfare State: 'I7re New Zealand Accident Compensa-
tion Act, 18 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 238 (1980). 
215. A number of theoretical considerations suggest some inherent shortcomings of indi-
vidualized insurance for tenants. First, individuals will have a relative disadvantage with re-
spect to the availability and reliability of the relevant information; a landlord will better 
understand the likelihood and severity of accidents to be expected from defects in his proper-
ties, because he has the benefit of the experience of many different tenants over a longer period 
of time. Another problem is that those with the highest risk of premises-caused injuries are 
those least likely to locate affordable insurance. Unless low-risk and high-risk tenants arc 
grouped under the same insurance regime, losses will not be spread interpersonally, only in-
tertemporally. On both points, see generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 55-64 
(1970). 
216. 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Civ. Ct. 1976). See text accompanying notes 115-
23 supra. · 
217. 85 Misc. 2d at 750, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638. 
218. 85 Misc. 2d at 750-51, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638. 
219. 85 Misc. 2d at 750, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638. 
220. The relevant portion of the Louisiana Civil Code states: 
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may 
prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of 
such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, 
provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to the 
lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for the same. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1973). 
221. See, e.g., Frey v. Galle, 399 So. 2d 1300 (La. App. 1981); Anderson v. Sciambra, 310 
So. 2d 128 (La. App. 1975); Revon v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 354 (La. 
App. 1973); Wilson v. Virgademo, 258 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1972). 
November 1982) The Taming ef a JJuty 141 
The limited nature of this sort of liability seems to preclude the 
existence of facts that would permit the defenses of voluntary as-
sumption of risk or contributory negligence.222 
IV. EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS 
Leases may contain variously worded provisions, most of which 
are broadly stated to relieve a landlord or his agent or employee 
from liability for personal injuries (or property damage) resulting 
from the condition of leased premises ( or from any cause). Such 
clauses may also include a provision whereby the tenant agrees to 
hold the landlord harmless from any claim for damages. Provisions 
that the tenant shall accept the premises "as is" or shall assume the 
duty to repair have sometimes been treated as exculpatory clauses.223 
The traditional law has been that such clauses are valid, even where 
liability is alleged for a landlord's negligence.224 Vindication of free-
dom of contract was asserted, sometimes including a denial that the 
landlord/tenant relation is one raising any countervailing policy.225 
Recently, however, inroads have been made against this rule. 
Mainly a contrary result has been dictated by a finding of unequal 
bargaining power226 in residential leases or occasionally a finding of 
unconscionabillty.227 Unequal bargaining power is usually based on 
a finding or an assumption of the existence of an acute housing 
shortage. One court recently found that the very existence of an ex-
culpatory clause is a sign of unequal bargaining power.228 Several 
courts have drawn a distinction between active and passive negli-
gence of a landlord, invalidating the clause in the cases of active 
222. It should be emphasized again that the strict liability suggested here should apply 
only in circumstances where the requirement of notice to landlords of the existence of defects 
is inapplicable because neither party knew anything about the defect nor is properly charge-
able with notice. It is a matter of degree and of judgment whether such a rule should extend to 
cases where a tenant does not know but should have known of the defect. In its application, 
such a rule would mean that wherever strict liability is asserted against the landlord, he may, 
as a defense, prove that the tenant knew (or should have known) of the defect but failed to 
notify the landlord or make a reasonable effort to do so. Or, as a procedural alternative, a 
tenant asserting strict liability might be required to prove that he had no knowledge of the 
defect (and perhaps also that the defect was not apparent to one using the premises). 
223. See, e.g., Jones v. Houston Aristocrat Apartments, 572 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1978). 
224. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 328 (1973). 
225. See, e.g., O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 
545 (1958). 
226. See, e.g., Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969); Cardona 
v. Eden Realty Co., 118 NJ. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (1972). 
227. See, e.g., Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969); Cardona 
v. Eden Realty Co., 118 N.J. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (1972). · 
228. Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., 118 NJ. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (1972). · 
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negligence.229 A number of cases have held that duties, specific or 
general, imposed by housing or other laws assert a public policy that 
invalidates contractual efforts to relieve landlords from such a 
duty.230 Where an exculpatory clause was offered to relieve a land-
lord of negligence in maintaining common areas in an apartment 
building, the Mississippi court recently held it against public policy, 
without reference to bargaining power or unconscion-
ability.231 
Most of the above law may now be superseded. Statutes in sev-
eral states have expressly declared exculpatory clauses invalid.232 In 
states where the implied warranty of habitability has been declared, 
courts have held that the duty created cannot be varied or waived by 
lease provisions.233 Tort liability was not involved in these cases, but 
if a court holds that a breach of warranty has tort consequences, it is 
hardly to be expected that courts would prevent contracting against 
nontort liability while permitting exculpation for tort liability.234 
Of greatest current significance are all the new landlord-tenant 
statutes or amendments. A section forbidding exculpatory or indem-
nifying provisions appears in the URLTA,235 but in the sections im-
posing duties on landlords to maintain premises, it is provided that, 
in respect to a single-family residence, the parties may agree in writ-
ing that the tenant shall perform the landlord's duty or make speci-
fied repairs only if entered into in good faith and not for the purpose 
229. See, e.g., Matthews v. Mountain Lodge Apartments, Inc., 388 So. 2d 935 (Ala. 1980). 
Cf. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Home Ins. Co., 88 Wis. 2d 124, 276 N.W.2d 348 (1979) 
(landlord's deliberate failure to take corrective action was active negligence). In Taylor v. 
Leady & Co., 412 So. 2d 763 (Ala. 1982), without disturbing its distinction between active and 
passive negligence where the negligent act occurs after the beginning of the lease, the court 
said that the concealment of a known latent defect is a willful act not protected by an exculpa-
tory clause. Three concurring justices felt that it was time for the court to announce the inva-
lidity of all exculpatory clauses in residential leases, asserting that the exculpatory clauses not 
only violated public policy but are prima facie unconscionable. 
230. E.g., Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256 A.2d 249 (1969); John's Pass Seafood v. 
Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla. App. 1979); Feldman v. Stein Bldg. & Lumber Co., 6 Mich. App. 
180, 148 N.W.2d 544 (1967). 
231. Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982). 
232. E.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8.208 (Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, 
§ 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
233. E.g., Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Green v. 
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Boston Housing 
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash, 2d 22, 
515 P.2d 160 (1973): Although these cases did not involve tort liability, courts may extend the 
prohibition against waivers of warranties to include waivers of tort claims. 
234. Assuming, of course, that a court concedes a link between a breach of warranty and 
tort liability. 
235. URLTA, supra note 57, at § 1.403. This section should be read together with the 
section prescribing a landlord's duty to maintain leased premises, which includes provisions 
that permit limited shifting of specified duties to a tenant. See id. at § 2.104. 
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of evading the landlord's duties.236 With respect to other kinds of 
dwelling units, the parties may agree that the tenant is to perform 
specified repairs only if the agreement appears in a separate writing 
and is supported by adequate consideration, is entered in good faith, 
etc., as in the case of a single-family residence, and the work pre-
scribed is not necessary to cure noncompliance of the statutes; but 
the parties may not make the performance of the separate agreement 
a condition to any obligation of any rental agreement.237 A dozen 
states have such or similar provisions.238 Statutes in a larger number 
of states have less restricted provisions: a number contain only the 
requirement of good faith and the purpose not be to evade a land-
lord's duties;239 one simply prescribes good faith;240 two permit the 
modification of duties in leases for a term of one year or more,241 or 
nine months or more;242 and one simply permits a shift in bµrdens to 
a tenant as consideration for the rental agreement. 243 The Texas 
statute provides that the relevant lease provision be in bold face type 
or underlined and be entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and for 
certain consideration. 244 In a half dozen states, the statutes contain 
nothing on such clauses.245 It should be noted that the above provi-
sions permitting restricted exculpatory clauses are applicable to the 
newly enlarged duty of landlords respecting habitability and compli-
ance with housing codes. As in the URL TA, some statutes contain 
more general provisions rendering void clauses exculpating land-
lords. Exculpatory clauses are probably void under such provisions 
unless the particular duty involved is covered by the narrower and 
more permissive statutory provisions surveyed above. 
In those states that have declared a tort duty on landlords not 
dependent upon specific violations of a warranty of habitability or a 
statute, it remains to be seen how exculpatory contracts will fare. 
Since a strong public interest is asserted as the basis for the duty, it 
can be expected that exculpatory clauses will not fare well. 
236. URLTA, supra note 57, at § 2.104(b). 
237. URLTA, supra note 57, § 2-104(c). 
238. See the statutes cited in note 55 supra for the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Dela-
ware, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, and 
Oklahoma. · 
239. See the statutes cited in note 55 supra for the following states: Hawaii, New Mexico, 
Tennessee, and Virginia. 
240. NEV. REV. STAT. § 118a.290 {1981). 
241. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.139 {Supp. 1981). 
242. R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 34-18-16 {1969). 
243. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1942.1 (West Supp. 1981). 
244. True. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236F § 13 {Vernon Supp. 1981). 
245. Idaho, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. 
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Overall, exculpatory clauses in residential leases may be on their 
way into oblivion, or at most to a restricted, minor role in landlord-
tenant relations. 
IV. LIABILITY FOR CRIMES OF THIRD PERSONS 
This is a story of violent crimes - mostly murders, rapes, and 
gunfire, rather than merely burglaries and thefts - in apartments 
and apartment buildings. The fear felt by most residents in many 
areas is heightened in tenants because the incidence of crime is 
greater in multi-unit facilities and because in such areas there is little 
or nothing a tenant can do to protect himself. It is natural to assume 
that some responsibility rests on landlords because, apart from police 
protection, they are usually the only persons who can take protective 
measures. On the other hand, the situation has so deteriorated, espe-
cially in large low-income housing projects, that crime seems to be 
the order of the day, so that one may despair about any e.ff ort to 
remedy or alleviate the situation. 
A. The Duty To Act 
In respect to landlords' responsibility in this situation, the first 
problem again is the basis for finding a duty to do anything.246 
Many of the cases involve crimes in common areas of residential 
buildings. One may resort to the traditional duty of landlords to dis-
cover unsafe conditions and make them safe.247 Traditionally this 
duty was thought of as involving injuries sustained because of physi-
cal defects in the property itself. Recently courts have had little 
trouble in extending the duty to injuries sustained from the crimes of 
intruders whose intrusions can be said to have been the foreseeable 
consequences of the condition of the premises. As likely as not, 
however, crimes will be committed within apartments, that is, on the 
premises leased and in the exclusive possession of the tenants. Here, 
if a duty is to be found, it must derive from the larger new duty of 
landlords created by an implied warranty of habitability or a similar 
duty declared by statutes. From either source the duty is commonly 
defined as including a duty to keep the leased premises safe. The 
extension of this duty to include security against criminal invasions 
246. The traditional attitude was recently asserted in King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc., 632 
P.2d 657 (Hawaii App. 1982), asserting the absence of a duty unless there is some special 
relationship between the parties, of which the landlord-tenant relation is not one, The court 
distinguished Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970), as in-
volving special circumstances not present here. 
241. See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text. 
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is no more difficult, and perhaps easier, than an extension of the 
traditional duty respecting areas remaining within landlords' 
control. 
The leading case is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Corp. 248 
The plaintiff was criminally assaulted in a common hallway in an 
apartment building. In imposing a duty on the landlord, the court 
began with the traditional duty of landlords respecting the condition 
of common areas. But the court expanded this duty, observing that 
crime in individual apartments requires that an intruder gain access 
through common entries and passageways. Judge Wilkey had no 
difficulty linking such a duty to the familiar principle that one in the 
best position to prevent injury is obligated to do so: "[a]s between 
tenant and landlord, the landlord is the only one in the position to 
take the necessary acts of protection required."249 This rationale for 
the Kline result reflects the sort of independent negligence analysis 
we have already seen in the context of accidental injuries. 
But in the light of the policies underlying the expansion of tradi-
tional tort doctrine to encompass some expanded duty for landlords, 
the temptation to rely upon the implied warranty of habitability 
proved irresistible to the Kline court in the context of criminal third-
party behavior.250 And beyond grounding the landlord's newfound 
duty in the implied warranty as well as the conditions of modem 
urban living, the court's reference to Javins as clearing away ''the 
legal underbrush" of the old law indicates that this duty may rest on 
all laIJ,dlords of residential premises.251 
Subsequent courts have played many variations on these two 
themes. In several major states the absence of a decision by the ju-
risdiction's highest court has left the issue in doubt, but in general 
the traditional tort rationale has been relied on. Thus, in a later Dis-
trict of Columbia case, the court appeared content to base liability 
on the landlord's duty to maintain common areas.252 In Florida, one 
court approved the notion that access to apartments implies access 
through common areas.253 A court in another district upheld liabil-
ity for a rape committed by an intruder in an apartment with a de-
fective door lock, a latent defect known to the landlord but not to the 
tenant, but refused to declare any general duty on the part of the 
248. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
249. 439 F.2d at 484. 
250. 439 F.2d at 482. 
251. 439 F.2d at 482. 
252. Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. Ct App. 1980). 
253. Holley v. Mt Zion Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. App. 1980). 
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landlord.254 The appellate courts of California show a transition. 
The notion was expressed that access to an apartment implies access 
through a common area.255 But initial reluctance was expressed to 
find a bi;oad duty such as that imposed on innkeepers.256 Then a 
court, citing Kline, said that recent inroads have been made on tradi-
tional landlord immunity, at least in an urban, residential context.257 
In the most recent case, the court seems to have accepted the view 
that a special relationship exists between landlord and tenant which 
justifies imposing on landlords a duty respecting foreseeable risks.258 
A New York court reversed a judgment for the defendant land-
lord in Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp. ,259 where the tenant was 
injured in the lobby of a building that had a broken lock on the entry 
door. The issues as framed centered on proximate cause, but by en-
tertaining this analysis the court indicated that the fact that the risk 
resulted from the intervening criminal conduct of another party was 
irrelevant. The opinion notes the approval of Kline in other jurisdic-
tions, but maintained that the issue in Kline was not reached in the 
instant case. It is not clear what the court thought the issue was in 
Kline. Perhaps this treatment of that decision meant no more than 
that the landord's duty existed merely in respect to common areas, 
such as the lobby of his apartment building. A later case in another 
judicial district, involving an assault in an unlighted parking lot, re-
lied on the landlord's duty respecting common areas.260 A civil court 
opinion based liability on these two cases, and on a decision in the 
court of appeals261 predicating liability for injury sustained in a 
lobby of a commercial building on the duty of a landowner respect-
ing access areas open to the public.262 
254. Whelan v. Dacomo "Enterprises, Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. App. 1981). 
255. See O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Reptr. 487 
(1977). 
256. Totten v. More Oakland Resid. Hous., Inc. 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 
(1977). 
257. Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978). 
258. Kwaitbowsky v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 
(1981). 
259. 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (1975). 
260. Loeser v. Nathan Hale Gardens, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 187; 425 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 
1980). 
261. Nallan v. Helmsby-Spear, Inc., SO N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 
(1980). 
262. Dick v. Great South Bay Co., 106 Misc. 2d 696, 435 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ. Ct. 1981). In 
Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 265, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969), a public housing author-
ity was authorized to provide a uniformed police force. The authority elected to assume such 
powers, but was found to have taken inadequate measures to implement its authority. It was 
held liable in a suit for wrongful death of a daughter of a tenant who was raped and murdered 
within the premises under the authority's control. 
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The Maryland court has recognized that a landowner may incur 
liability for personal injuries of tenants arising from the criminal acts 
of third persons in common areas, but has restricted this liability 
with a fairly rigorous foreseeability standard.263 The Virginia court, 
in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff-tenant, refused to approve 
any general duty owed by the landlord for the provision of protec-
tion against the criminal acts of third parties.264 But the court cited 
Kline as approving recovery in certain circumstances where the risk 
of criminal assault was clearly foreseeable.265 
In Johnston v. Harris266 a tenant was assaulted upon entering 
through an unlocked door into a dimly lighted vestibule in an apart-
ment building located in a high-crime area. The court of appeals 
treated the action as based on the failure of the defendant's "dece-
dent," the landlord, to provide proper locks and lighting. The 
supreme court found that this basis for liability was too narrow and 
did not take account of the allegation that the landlord was negligent 
in creatmg a condition conducive to criminal assaults. The court re-
lied on Section 302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.261 The 
court failed to notice that, although the section refers to omissions, as 
well as to acts, it does not impose a duty upon all persons to take 
affirmative action to protect other persons from the crimes of third 
parties. Section 302B is merely a special application of section 
302A.268 It is clear that the omissions referred to in section 302A are 
those arising out of acts, such as where a person constructs a building 
which blocks a sidewalk but fails to provide a guardrail against traf-
fic on the street. Section 302B expands the scope of the rule in a 
comment that refers to circumstances where the defendant is under a 
special responsiblity toward the individual who suffers harm. The 
Restatement does not specifically include the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship among those, such as the inkeeper-guest relationship, that 
give rise to such an obligation. This would not have prevented the 
court from finding a sufficient similarity between these relationships 
to justify the imposition of an affirmative duty, but the court did not 
263. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976). 
264. Gulf !leston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974). 
265. 215 Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845. 
266. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). 
267. "An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third 
person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal." REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). 
268. "An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of 
the other or a third person." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302A (1965). 
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make the point explicit. Similarly, the facts fail to indicate whether 
the vestibule where the assault took place was a common entryway 
or led only to the plaintiff's apartment. The decision therefore leaves 
unclear whether the court would have extended the landlord's duty 
beyond the familiar obligation to keep common areas in a proper 
condition. A later case affirmed judgment for a tenant in an office 
building who was injured by a patient in a mental health clinic, 
which was a tenant in the same building.269 Although the main 
issue concerned proximate cause, the court recognized that the land-
lord's duty was based on its control of the common areas, which of 
course is nothing more than the duty of any possessor to persons 
properly upon his land. 
Reference was made to the refusal of Illinois courts to extend the 
traditional tort liability of landlords.270 It was only to be expected 
that these courts would discover no duty in the landlord to protect 
the tenant from crime. The Illinois courts in fact have so held, both 
in cases of crimes in apartments and in common areas. Most of these 
cases arose out of crimes in public housing projects in Chicago. In a 
decision by the supreme court, a provision of the State Housing Au-
thority Act requiring landlords to provide decent, safe, and sanitary 
dwellings, was held to refer merely to the physical condition of the 
premises.271 But the supreme court imposed liability on the basis of 
the way security guards were used, that is, they were off-duty during 
certain hours, which was found to increase the hazards during those 
hours.272 Recently that case was explained and limited by the asser-
tion of an exception where a landlord undertakes to provide security 
measures but does so negligently.273 The prior case was declared to 
stand for that proposition and not the proposition that a landlord is 
under a duty not to increase the danger from criminal intrusions, in 
the absence of a voluntary undertaking to provide security. It is pos-
sible that the court's rigorous ruling may not withstand other excep-
tions, the definitions of which are not yet discernible. The supreme 
court, in the two cases mentioned above, made no reference to an 
269. Samson v. Saginaw.Professional Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975). But 
see Escobarv. Brent Gen. Hosp., 106 Mich. App. 828,308 N.W.2d 691 (1981), where the court 
held that no duty was owed to a tenant in a house who was robbed in a driveway adjacent to 
the hoµse, in the absence of any showing that the house was improperly maintained or without 
outside lights. In cases of this kind, the court said that the landlord owed no duty to provide 
security personneL 
270. See notes 82-92 supra and accompanying tex:t. 
271. Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 299 N.E.2d 596 (1979). 
272. Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 82 Ill. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980). 
273. See Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 91 Ill. App. 3d 544, 414 N.E.2d 1133 (1981). 
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earlier case in the appellate court where entries into a tenant's apart-
ment were made on three occasions by breaking through a wall. 274 
Notifications and protests about the earlier break-ins were made to 
the landlord. The court threw up its hands and said that, given the 
"bizarre facts" and nature of the prior burglaries, another occurrence 
was eminently foreseeable, and the defendant was obligated to guard 
against it. 
A few courts have sought to go the warranty route. In a case 
brought in federal district court in Kansas, the court initially found 
no basis in Kansas law for imposing liability on a landlord for negli-
gence that allegedly permitted the rape of the plaintiff in her apart- · 
ment.275 The case led to another opinion after the plaintiff alleged 
breach of an express and an implied warranty.276 This time the 
plaintiff won a verdict, and the court denied the defendant's motion 
for judgment n.o.v. The court relied on Steele v. Latimer,211 which 
recognized an implied warranty that a landlord will keep the prem-
ises in the same condition as they were in· at the beginning of the 
tenancy. In denying liability for negligence, but sustaining liability 
for breach of warranty, these opinions raise the question whether the 
warranty path to finding a duty of security against third-party in-
truders leads to strict liability whenever tenants suffer injuries from 
crimes upon the premises. 
The development of this approach in the New Jersey courts sug-
gests this very outcome. In Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corpora-
tion, 278 a landlord was held liable for the theft of property from a 
tenant's apartment, alleged to have resulted from a defective dead-
bolt lock in a door. All the justices concurred, but three opinions 
were written, leaving the rationale in doubt. The following grounds 
were mentioned with some reservations as to their independent suffi-
ciency: a broad view of Kline as a response to prevailing urban con-
ditions; the foreseeability of criminal conduct; the existence of an 
implied warranty of habitability; and the violation of statutory regu-
lations as either evidence or conclusive evidence of negligence. The 
assertion of the implied warranty as an independent rationale was 
274. Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975). The court 
felt that these extreme facts justified an exception to the general rule. The facts in the case 
were exceptional, but only in degree, and leave some doubt about when an Illinois court may 
be willing to depart from its general rule. A subsequent opinion limited Stribling to its facts. 
See Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 91 Ill. App. 3d 544, 414 N.E.2d 1133 (1981). 
275. Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 497 F. Supp. 320 (D. Kan. 1980). 
276. Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980). 
277. 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974). 
278. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975). 
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accompanied by a footnote indicating that its acceptance would re-
quire a reconsideration of .Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments.219 
In Trentacost v. Brossel,280 the court faced the problem again in 
a case where a tenant was attacked and robbed in a hallway of an 
apartment building. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the 
court was again unanimous, although one justice wrote a limited 
concurring opinion and another dissented in part. The court reiter-
ated the validity of Kline and statutory violations as grounds of lia-
bility. But it also recognized breach of an implied warranty of 
habitability as an independent ground for the decision, thus taking 
the opportunity created in Braitman for effectively overruling .Dwyer. 
The court indicated the warranty requires a landlord to provide rea-
sonable security from the risk of criminal activities. There follows 
this consistent, but startling, proposition: since the warranty itself is 
not dependent on the landlord's knowledge of any risks, the plaintiff 
does not need to prove notice to the landlord of any unsafe condi-
tions.281 Strict liability has enjoyed limited success even without the 
added intervention of third-party criminals;282 aside from Flood, the 
federal decision in Kansas, this is the only decision even suggesting 
such a regime in this context. 283 The Brossel decision seems to hold 
landlords strictly accountable for every crime committed on their 
property, without regard to the reasonableness of their precautions 
or their knowledge of any risk. 
So we have seen the New Jersey court swinging from one ex-
treme to the other. First, the warranty of habitability is held irrele-
vant to a landlord's tort liability. Then the warranty is offered as the 
basis for strict liability. The source of the court's trouble is obvious. 
Instead of facing the difficult question whether strict liability is justi-
fied in these circumstances, and identifying proper factors justifying 
such liability, the court simply assumed that its prior judgment in 
favor of a warranty of habitability for nontort purposes automati-
cally produced strict liability for tort purposes. 
Other courts have been able to see a middle ground: breach of a 
279. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, qffd., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d I (1973), discussed supra 
at note 136. 
280. 82 NJ. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). 
281. 82 NJ. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443. 
282. See note 206 supra and accompanying text. 
283. In Kwaitkowsky v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 
(1981), the court, citing Trentacost, asserted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability as 
one ground imposing a duty on landlords. There was, however, no discussion of the dimen-
sions of such a duty. But in laying emphasis on the landlord's knowledge of a defective lock, 
and his failure to repair it, one senses little in the opinion to indicate an acceptance of n new 
kind of strict liability. 
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warranty of habitability is an important element in finding a land-
lord liable for negligence.284 Such a solution is fortified by a factor 
previously emphasized herein: often in these cases the condition of 
the premises develops after the lease begins, where it makes little 
sense to treat a landlord's non-tort duty as a true warranty rather 
than as a promise to repair. 
B. Scope of the Landlord's Duty 
It is not enough to declare a duty in a landlord to his tenants that 
embraces security against unlawful intrusions. A landlord is not lia-
ble for harm done by every criminal intruder. In cases not involving 
criminal acts of third persons, causation or foreseeability poses no 
special problem. Where a tenant is injured by a fall on a stairway 
where the steps are decayed or the lighting is insufficient, it is an easy 
step to ~d the landlord liable for failure to maintain proper condi-
tions. Here the problem is not so easy. Initially this problem was 
conceived of as one of proximate cause, where the criminal acts of 
· third persons could be treated as an intervening cause which insu-
lated landlords from liability.285 For the most part, the courts have 
had no difficulty in avoiding this conclusion. The reason given is 
that a landlord is not responsible for all crimes that may be commit-
ted on his property, but only for those that are foreseeable. 
There is no need here for any inquiry into tort law generally in 
regard to the role of or the relation between proximate cause and 
foreseeability. Whether articulated as a limit on the defendant's 
duty, a justification for his conduct as reasonable under the circum-
stances, or a failure to prove proximate cause, the emphasis courts 
place on foreseeability in these cases evidently means that foresee-
ability is an important ingredient in defining a landlord's duty.286 
Whatever may be the proper legal analysis, most of the recent cases 
have explicitly or implicitly asserted the foreseeability require-
ment.287 Presumably, even the New Jersey courts would do the same, 
284. See notes 136-58 supra and accompanying text. 
285. See Eldridge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Couse, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 121 
(1937); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 44 at 272 (4th ed. 1971). . 
286. The elements of negligence do not exist in isolation, and foreseeability is relevant to 
each of them. The prevailing approach views the risks of a defendant's conduct that a reason-
able man would foresee as defining the scope of duty and the limits of proximate cause. See, 
e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248_ N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 90, 100 (1928) (''The risk 
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1956). 
287. Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 497 F. Supp. 320 (D. Kan. 1980); Graham 
v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. App. 1980); O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal 
3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 56~, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); 
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at least with respect to allegations of negligence, as opposed to 
claims based on the implied warranty theory. 
The courts have taken widely varying approaches in determining 
what evidence is relevant to foreseeability. The Kline court re-
sponded to the objection that all crimes are foreseeable by arguing 
that only those crimes that are predictable and probable are foresee-
able.288 This was immediately tied to prior crimes, known to the 
landlord, on his property. The Maryland court limited the relevance 
of proof of prior criminal acts to those that occur on the premises in 
question.289 On the other hand, a New York civil court encountered 
no difficulty with the absence of such proofs, because of the rising 
crime rate in all neighborhoods. 290 
Several courts have had occasion to rule or comment on the fore-
seeability of crime in particular circumstances. One court said that a 
gunfight between unknown persons in a laundry room in an apart-
ment building was not to be anticipated,291 and another ruled that a 
heart attack induced by the throwing of a can of paint from the bal-
cony of an apartment building down upon the plaintiff was not fore-
seeable. 292 In another case, where a tenant was injured by a fire set 
by an evicted tenant, one judge concluded that the foreseeability 
question in these cases is too complex to be entrusted to a jury.293 
One court held that a showing of a high incidence of crime is not 
enough; prior incidents similar to the one complained of must be 
proved.294 
Few of the courts in the recent cases have addressed the issue of 
legal cause. Three courts295 have cited sections 448296 and 449297 of 
Sherman v. Concq!1f5e Realty Corp., 47 A.D. 134, 36S N.Y.S.2d 230 (197S); GulfReston, Inc, 
v. Rogers, 21S Va. 15S, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974). 
288. 439 F.2d at 483. 
289. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 3S9 A.2d S48 (1976). 
290. Dick v. Great South Bay, 106 Misc. 2d 686, 43S N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ. Ct. 1981). 
291. Totten v. More Oakland Resid. Hous., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d S38, 134 Cal. Rptr, 29 
(1977). 
292. Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 21S Va. 15S, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974). 
293. Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 108 (D.C. App. 1980) (Nebeker, J,, 
dissenting). 
294. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 3S9 A.2d S48 (1976). 
29S. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 7S Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977); 
Holley v. Mount Zion Terrace Apartments, 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. App. 1980); Johnston v. Harris, 
387 Mich. S69, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). 
296. ''The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding 
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a 
situtation which afforded the opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, 
unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likeli-
. hood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the 
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts to support their decisions. In one 
of these the court remarked that section 448 recognizes the underly-
ing significance of the element of foreseeability.298 
The cases suggest that the courts are concerned by something that 
is not explained merely by a simple standard of foreseeability as an 
answer to treating criminal intrusions as superseding causes. Part of 
this concern may reflect the perceived futility of attempts to prevent 
crime by the assertion of tort duties. Another factor contributing to 
this concern may be the apprehension that any case which goes to a 
jury under general tort instructions about a heinous crime committed 
within rental housing will inevitably result in a verdict for the plain-
tiff. Most people are angry and frustrated about the prevalence of 
violent crime, and about the inability of victims to do anything about 
it; they are likely to take any means offered to shift the burden of 
crime prevention from innocent victims. This can result in putting 
burdens on landlords that they are no better able to bear than are the 
police. And the negative economic consequences of imposing this 
burden on the operators of low-income housing, the site of the great-
est incidence of crime, surely exceed those attributed to the imposi-
tion of the duty on landlords to provide habitable dwellings.299 
This state of affairs may not be conducive to a simple and 
straightforward solution. One may expect some courts to dispose of 
some cases by a narrowing of the scope of a landlord's duty. Note 
how some courts apparently have responded to the problem. The 
Illinois courts refused to lay down a rule that conceded a landlord's 
liability for criminal intrusions; but in one case asserted a landlord's 
liability where three identical crimes were committed by the same 
means in the same apartment.300 The Maryland court defined a 
landlord's duty, in response to a certification of questions, as limited 
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 448 (rent. 
Draft No. 17, 1971). 
297. "If the likelihood tha~ a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or 
one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, 
intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused 
thereby." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (rent. Draft No. 17, 1971). 
298. Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). 
299. Low-income housing is the site of most residential crime; if the costs of security meas-
ures are passed on to tenants, an unexpected hardship will be imposed on the very people a 
strict liability standard is intended to protect. See Recent Development, Expanding the Scope 
of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's .Duty lo Protect Tenantsftom Foreseeable 
Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493, 1519 (1980). Cf. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 
N.J. 578, 591, 186 A.2d 241, 298 (1962) ("The bill will be paid, not by the owner, but by the 
tenants. And if, as we apprehend, the incidence of crime is greatest in the area in which the 
poor must live, they, and they alone, will be singled out to pay for their own police 
protection."). 
300. Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975). 
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to circumstances where the landlord knows or should know of prior 
criminal activity within his own common areas, but not of criminal 
activity in the neighborhood.301 A New York court, in sustaining a 
landlord's liability where he had failed to provide a proper lock on a 
lobby door, refused to concede that it was following the rule of 
Kline. 302 The California courts, obviously affected by the direction 
taken by Kline, are still in conflict about throwing down the old bars 
to liability and treating landlords like innkeepers. One California 
court, in following Kline, emphasized that the plaintiff was not the 
victim of a sudden unexpected outburst of gunfire ( as in a prior 
case), but was raped in the same manner as other tenants in the same 
building.303 As for Kline itself, the court, in defining foreseeable 
crime as "probable and predictable," laid emphasis on the fact that 
tenants other than the plaintiff had been subjected to crimes within 
the same building as the result of the defendant's abandonment of 
security measures previously taken. In fact, Kline was one of the 
easiest kinds of cases in which to impose liability on a landlord. It is 
not always easy to tell, where courts have followed Kline, whether 
the court is moved more by Kline's sweeping generalities than by 
Kline's possibly narrowing implications. 
It is not easy to generalize from these responses. If we see, more 
than anytJting else, an emphasis on prior crimes within a defendant's 
property, and ai least one refusal to extend foreseeability beyond 
those boundaries, does this relate less to foreseeability than to the 
adequacy of the defendant's conduct in securing the premises? The 
concerns suggested about the consequences of an unrestricted appli-
cation of foreseeability might in fact be resolved by centering atten-
tion· on the adequacy of a defendant's conduct in the circumstances, 
that is, did the defendant take security measures that were reason-
able in the circumstances? Any thoughtful person will realize that a 
landlord should not be cast in the role of a private law enforcement 
agency nor expected to prevent all crimes on his property. Do some 
courts believe that, for reasons previously stated, a jury is unable or 
unwilling to make such a thoughtful judgment? Note the view ex-
pressed by one dissenting justice that the foreseeability issue in these 
cases is too complicated to entrust to a jury.304 
In striking contrast, we recall the New Jersey court's startling ac-
301. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976). 
302. Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D. 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975). 
303. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1978). 
304. Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 108 (D.C. App. 1980) (Nebeker, J., 
dissenting). 
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ceptance of something very close to strict liability.305 
The future of this law is difficult to predict. Surely we will con-
tinue to see liability imposed on landlords for injuries resulting from 
the criminal acts of third persons. It is not clear, however, whether 
at least some courts will seek, by undefined, perhaps undefinable, 
means to limit landlords' duty by something more than instructions 
to a jury on traditional negligence and causation standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Something happened to the bandwagon on its way into the brave 
new world !)f landlord-tenant law. Property law was rejected, con-
tract law was embraced, and tort law was simply overlooked. Then 
inevitably tort cases began to rear their heads, and instead of hearing 
more plaudits for the implied warranty of habitability, we began to 
witness an extraordinary scenario of hesitations, backing and filling, 
pulling and hauling, and dramatic reversals over difficult pitfalls of 
doctrine and disturbing policy problems. The bitter fruit of a care-
less labelling as a warranty of increased duties on landlords finally 
came to harvest. Or, m contrast, courts like the Illinois court, spat 
out the fruit leaving landlords with some significant increase in lia-
bilities, but not for injuries sustained by tenants. These phenomena, 
however, do not subvert the new regime of increased landlord 
responsiblity. The problem is merely in making the inherently diffi-
cult adjustments of an essentially nontort duty to accommodate 
properly its tort implications. The more dramatic stresses in a few 
leading jurisdictions do not provide the full measure of what has 
been going on. For the most part, courts have so far managed rea-
sonably well to gain iheir equilibrium. The result, again for the most 
part, is the hardly exciting prospect of finding a resting place in the 
traditional law of negligence. Most courts who cheerfully rode an-
other bandwagon into strict products liability have drawn back here, 
and again perhaps for good reason. But strict liability cannot be 
summarily dismissed and may need to be adapted in some degree for 
these purposes, as a complementary companion of negligence 
liability. 
The courts in general have also recently moved toward recogniz-
ing a duty in landlords to take protective measures against violent 
crime in and around apartment buildings. The basic obstacle, the 
absence of a relationship that would justify a duty of affirmative ac-
tion, has been readily overcome in most juris9ictions. This has been 
305. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980), discussed supra at note 279. 
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accomplished by a combination of an extension of landlords' tradi-
tional duty respecting the condition of common areas under their 
control and the assertion of a similar but broader duty arising from 
the recent enlargement of landlords' duty generally by virtue of stat-
utes or judicial decisions. The need for a limitation of this duty has 
been met by the assertion of liability only for reasonably foreseeable 
criminal intrusions. Considerable litigation can be expected ·over the 
administration of this standard. There are signs that some courts 
may not be willing to define a landlord's duty merely in terms of 
foreseeable risks, but just how it might otherwise be defined, or what 
other limitations might be imposed, is not yet evident. 
